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TOWARD A DUTY-BASED THEORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER 
 
David M. Driesen* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article develops a duty-based theory of executive 
power.  This theory maintains that the Constitution seeks to instill a 
duty in all executive branch officers to faithfully execute the law.  
Conversely, the Constitution’s framers and ratifiers did not intend to 
empower the President to distinctively shape the law to suit his 
policy preferences or those of his party.  Rather, they envisioned a 
model of “disinterested leadership” serving rule of law values.  
Because of the ratifiers’ and framers’ interest in preventing abuse of 
executive power the Constitution obligates executive branch 
officials to disobey illegal presidential directives and creates a major 
Congressional role in preventing illegal executive action, primarily 
by assigning the Senate a major role in appointments and removal.     
The duty-based theory fits original intent better than the 
unitary executive theory popular these days among originalists.  
Both the Constitutional text and the pre-enactment history show a 
preoccupation with establishing duties, preventing real abuse, and 
securing stable administration, rather an effort to establish 
presidential control over executive branch discretion.  The duty-
based theory also serves rule of law values better than the unitary 
executive theory.  This article closes with a discussion of the 
theory’s implications for key separation of powers issues involving 
the execution of law. 
   
                                                   
*
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 This Article develops a duty-based theory of executive power.1  
This theory conceives of the Constitution as an effort to establish a rule 
of law, rather than a reign of Presidential personality.2  As part of this 
effort, the Constitution imposes a duty upon the President and all other 
executive branch officials to obey the law,3 relying upon a variety of 
approaches to encourage compliance.  It seeks to instill allegiance to the 
law in all executive branch officials, provides for significant 
congressional and judicial control over the executive branch, and 
envisions principled but vigorous presidential leadership. 
 An emphasis on presidential duty fits the relatively modest 
conception of the “Chief Magistrate[’s]” political role prevailing at the 
founding, for the Framers expected the President generally to cede policy-
making authority to Congress and to dutifully execute, rather than 
distinctively shape, the law.4  The modern notion of a President and his 
faction using his political “preferences” to mold the law was utterly foreign 
to the Framers, even though they did understand that legal administration 
requires some discretionary judgment.5  While historians have recognized 
Republican ideology’s concept of “disinterested leadership” as a consensus 
view at the founding,6 contemporary legal scholars have not explored this 
concept’s implications for executive power theories. 
This Article offers a fresh bottoms-up perspective on the very old 
debate over executive power.  Its explanation of how the Constitution 
creates duties in lower executive branch officials as a check on presidential 
                                                   
1
 See David M. Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707 (2008) (providing a 
brief preliminary sketch of the theory developed and fleshed out more fully here). 
2
 See GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 124-25 
(1993) (describing the founding generation’s commitment to the rule of law as including the 
concept that the law “bound lawmakers and citizens equally”); 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 318-19 (rev. ed. 1966) (recounting an argument against 
the New Jersey plan as failing remedy the law’s “impotence” under the Articles of 
Confederation); II ID. at 64 (arguing that the President should be impeachable because no 
man should be “above Justice.”); accord Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (linking the “proud boast of our democracy that we have ‘a 
government of laws and not of men’” to the principle of separation of powers).  See 
generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAH, ON THE RULE OF LAW:  HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004). 
3
 See PHELPS, supra note 2, at 125 (describing this commitment to law governing the 
government as distinguishing a Republic from monarchy). 
4
 See, e.g.,  ID. at 150-54 (discussing George Washington’s practice of not vetoing domestic 
measures he disagreed with). 
5
 See, e.g.,  ID. at 81 (explaining that the notion of competing notions of the public interest 
appeared nonsensical to George Washington, since he believed in a single public interest 
that all virtuous men would endorse); William J. Kelleher, The Original Intentions of the 
Framers for U.S. Presidential Elections, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317837 
(2008) (discussing the Framers’ abhorrence of faction and how they structured Presidential 
elections to avoid it). 
6
 See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:  A HISTORY 165 (2003) 
(discussing the Framers’ “vision of disinterested leadership”).  
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abuse of power constitutes one of this Article’s most distinctive 
contributions to that debate.7  While other commentators have recognized 
that lower executive branch officials usefully check presidential 
decisionmaking,8 they have not hitherto recognized that this check forms 
part of the Framers’ design. 
The duty-based theory provides an alternative to the unitary 
executive theory of presidential power.  Unitarians (proponents of the 
unitary executive theory) claim that the Constitution gives the President 
complete control over all executive branch decisions.  The duty-based 
theory, by contrast, insists that the Constitution denies the President 
complete control over the executive branch of government in order to assure 
fidelity to law.   
 The unitary executive theory can, at times, undermine the rule of 
law in favor of a rule of presidential personality.9  Thus, belief in a version 
of the unitary executive theory encouraged the President, the Vice President, 
and several executive branch lawyers to support illegal torture, wiretapping, 
and procedures for prosecuting “enemy combatants.”10  The duty-based 
theory, by contrast, aims to resurrect a robust rule of law.11 
                                                   
7
 Cf. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 
U. PA. L. REV. 603, 651 (2001) (describing the fragmentation of power within branches of 
government as “our assurance against threatening concentrations of government power.”). 
8
 See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws:  Internal Legal Constraints on 
Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1560-62 (2007) (describing the U.S. Congress 
and the courts as “the most obvious checks on the President” but identifying “legal advisers 
within the executive branch” as an “underappreciated” source of constraint); Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers:  Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from 
Within, 115 YALE L. J. 2314, 2316-17 (2006) (presenting use of bureaucracies’ ability to 
check executive branch abuse as a functional proposal to compensate for the demise of the 
equilibrium between the executive and legislative branches that the Framers sought to 
achieve).    
9
 See Robert D. Sloane, The Scope of Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century an 
Introduction, 88 B.U. L. REV. 341, 343 (2008) (characterizing a new unitary executive 
theory as a basis for “a view of the scope of the executive power of unprecedented 
breadth.”); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:  LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 85 (2007) (discussing the Cheney-Addington view of the unitary 
executive theory as prohibiting Congressional interference with presidential decisions 
during wartime).  Of course, the “cult of personality” has its roots in the tradition of electing 
Presidents.  Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 657 
(2000) (associating the cult of personality with presidential elections).  But the unitary 
executive theory, by strengthening the Presidency, enhances the influence of this cult of 
personality.  
10
  See CHARLES SAVAGE, THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION 
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 49-50, 124-27, 130-39, 146-150, 153-56, 176-181, 240, 271-73 
(2008) (describing how the Bush-Cheney team’s “new improved unitary executive theory” 
led these actors to believe that the commander-in-chief could properly carry out these illegal 
actions); Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath:  NSA Surveillance and Executive Power, 88 
B.U.L. Rev. 375, 383-84 (2008) (describing the link between the DOJ memorandum 
justifying illegal wiretapping and the “Vesting Clause thesis”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 
U.S. 507, 533-38 (2004) (holding that a United States citizen accused of being an enemy 
combatant was unconstitutionally denied a fair hearing and notice of the factual basis for 
allegations against him); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,  613, 625 (2006) (holding that 
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 The Constitution’s text, I will argue, supports the duty-based theory 
presented here.  This textualism is important, because the unitary executive 
theory’s allure stems largely from its claim of fidelity to constitutional 
text.12  By focusing heavily on text, I hope to more directly engage the core 
of the argument for the unitary executive position.  Proponents and 
opponents of the unitary executive theory often speak past each other, 
because proponents of the theory tend to emphasize text and original intent 
while most of the theory’s critics emphasize functional considerations and 
the actual practice of government.13  This Article builds on and adds to 
previous scholars’ textualist critiques, but its textual analysis supports a 
competing vision of executive power, not just a critique of the unitary 
executive theory.14  Although this duty-based theory relies primarily upon 
                                                                                                                            
the Military Commission’s procedures violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
the Geneva Conventions); American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, 438 
F. Supp. 2d 754, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2006), reversed and vacated on other grounds,  493 F.3d 
644 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the warrantless wiretapping program violated the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act and the Fourth Amendment).  In order to make this Article 
manageable, this Article will not examine the relationship between the unitary executive 
theory and inherent presidential power to address terrorism.  Cf. SAVAGE, supra, at 124-27 
(discussing the relationship in broad outline).  
11
 Cf. Lawson, supra note 10, at 376 (identifying the view of the Article II Vesting Clause as 
a power grant as crucial to justifying wiretapping without the warrants required by the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (No. 16,342) 
(D.N.Y. 1806) (reading the “take care clause” as establishing a duty to obey the law and 
therefore declining to allow the President’s approval of military action to justify a private 
violation of the Neutrality Act). 
12
 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (claiming 
that the text of Article II, § 1, cl. 1 requires that the President must have “all of  the 
executive power.”) (emphasis in original); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, 
The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550-56 (1994) (claiming 
that constitutional text supports the unitary executive theory and arguing for text’s 
“primacy”). 
13
 See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary 
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1170 (1992) (claiming that non-
unitarians offer functionalist theories instead of the “formal power grant construction” that 
unitarians rely upon). Compare Calabresi & Prakash supra note 12, at 551-56 (arguing for 
text’s “primacy”) with Peter Strauss, Overseer or “The Decider”?  The President in 
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007) [hereinafter Overseer] (focusing 
heavily on constitutional practice, including contemporary practice); Lawrence Lessig & 
Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L, REV. 1, 17-20-32 
(1994) (relying heavily upon lessons drawn from practice in the early Republic); Neal 
Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive:  What Makes an Agency Independent, 15 
CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 275 (1994) (focusing on the role of political actors in defining the 
unitariness of executive branch legal interpretations); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of 
Agencies in Government:  Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 
573, 581 (1984) [hereinafter Agencies] (assuming that “any useful legal analysis must” 
largely “accept” existing “reality”).  But see M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in 
Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1137-38 (2000) (describing the “unitary 
executive” debate as “dominated by constitutional-text parsing and dueling accounts of the 
original understanding”). 
14
 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Essay: Presidential Management of the Administrative 
State:  The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L. J. 963, 967-969 (2001) (providing a brief 
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Constitutional text, this presentation of the theory will also examine non-
textual evidence of original intent, case law, and functional factors.15  The 
historical analysis presented here emphasizes pre-enactment history, which 
has heretofore played a very limited role in the contemporary debate on 
these issues.16 
This Article begins with a discussion of the unitary executive 
theory.  It then  develops and justifies the duty-based alternative.  Finally, it 
examines some of the duty-based theory’s implications for existing law.   
 
II.  THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY 
 Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson17 provides the leading 
judicial articulation of the unitary executive theory.  The Morrison majority 
upheld provisions of the Ethics in Government Act (Act)18 creating an 
independent counsel to investigate and prosecute high ranking officials’ 
crimes.19  In order to prevent presidential interference with independent 
counsel investigation and prosecution, Congress lodged the authority to 
appoint an independent counsel in the judiciary and only authorized the 
attorney general to remove him for “good cause.”20  While the Supreme 
                                                                                                                            
textualist argument for limited Presidential power); Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of 
Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L. J. 787, 799-801 (1987) (same).  Professors 
Sunstein and Lessig offer an important theory, but it does not so much compete with the 
unitary executive theory as narrow and reshape it.  See Lessig and Sunstein, supra note 13, 
at 4 (rejecting the conclusion that the unitary executive theory properly reaches “all 
administration of the laws.”).  They characterize the original understanding of the scope of 
executive power as narrower than today’s understanding.  Id. at 12-78 (developing a 
distinction between executive and administrative functions).  And they also argue that the 
broad modern theory might be right, but based on functional rather than historical 
considerations.  See id. at 2-3 (rejecting the claim that the Framers intended to require 
presidential control over all government officials implementing law, but finding that modern 
circumstances provide a “compelling nonhistorical argument” for the unitary executive).  
Nevertheless, Lessig and Sunstein offer a very significant argument.  Accord Calabresi & 
Prakash, supra note 12, at 545 (characterizing Lessig and Sunstein’s work as “seminal”).  
15
 I choose to focus primarily on original intent in order to more squarely meet the 
contentions of proponents of the unitary executive theory but do not take a position here on 
the validity of original intent approaches, which has generated a vast literature.  See, e.g.. H. 
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 
(1985) (arguing that the Framers did not intend that their intent would govern future 
construction of the Constitution); JACK N. RACKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:  POLITICS AND 
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); ROBERT H. BORK, THE  TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA (1990) (insisting on original intent’s primacy); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL 
INTENT AND THE FRAMER’S CONSTITUTION (1988). 
16
 See, e.g., STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH, 35 (2008) (devoting a half a sentence to 
the preenactment history 
of removal). 
17
 487 U.S. at 697-734. 
18
 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1982 ed., Supp. V).   This provision has now expired.   
19
 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659-660. 
20
 Id. at 660-664 (describing these provisions in detail). 
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Court upheld the Act’s removal and appointment provisions,21 Justice Scalia 
dissented on the grounds that these provisions interfered with presidential 
control over the executive branch of government22. 
 Justice Scalia’s dissent relied on the proposition that the President 
possesses “all executive” power under the Constitution.23  This idea, Scalia 
argues, stems from the Vesting Clause, Article II, § 1, cl. 1, which provides, 
“The executive Power shall be vested in the President of the United 
States.”24   Since the statute “deprive[s] the President . . . of exclusive 
control over the exercise” of a “purely executive power” (namely 
prosecution), argued Scalia, it conflicts with the Framers’ decision to give 
the President “all” executive power.25  This statement treats the Vesting 
Clause’s grant of “executive power” as a grant of “exclusive control,” 
thereby implying that the President does not share control of the executive 
branch with Congress or other federal officials.   
 Justice Scalia equates control with the power to appoint and remove 
executive branch officials.26  For Scalia, the President’s ability, through the 
Attorney General, to remove the Prosecutor “for cause” does not suffice; the 
President must have the ability to remove without cause.27  He strongly 
suggests that presidential control implies rejection of “an attitude of 
independence against the” President’s “will” among officers of the 
executive branch of government in favor of a system where all hold their 
office only if their conduct pleases the President.28  In other words, he 
equates control over the executive branch of government with the power to 
fire all of those carrying out executive duties for any reason or no reason 
whatsoever.  Likewise, Justice Scalia finds the inability of the President, 
through the Attorney General, to exercise control over the appointment of 
the independent counsel inconsistent with presidential control over the 
executive branch.29  
                                                   
21
 Id. at 670-697. 
22
 Id. at 705.   
23
 Id. (describing Article II, §, cl. 1 as lodging “all of the executive power in the President.”) 
(emphasis in original).   
24
 Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1). 
25
 Id. 
26
 With respect to removal, Justice Scalia states that the “principle that the President had to 
be the repository of all executive power . . . necessarily means that he must be able to 
discharge those who do not perform executive functions according to his liking.”)  Id. at 
726.  With respect to appointment, see infra note 29. 
27
 See id. at 706-707 (explaining why good cause removal does not amount to complete 
control).  
28
 Justice Scalia implies this through his argument that “good cause” removal provisions 
limit the removal power.  See id. at 706-707.  He points out that a person who can only be 
removed for good cause does not serve at the President’s pleasure.  Id. at 707.  Indeed, the 
purpose of a good cause removal provision is to allow the person protected by it to 
“maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.”  Id. (quoting Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).  By rejecting good cause removal, 
Scalia implicitly rejects executive branch independence from presidential will.   
29
 See id. at 701-703, 707 (criticizing the appointment provisions because they “severely 
confine” the Attorney General’s ability to refuse appointment of an independent counsel).  
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I shall refer to the idea that presidential control over the executive 
branch implies presidential control over appointment and removal as the 
“patronage state theory.”30  While this term highlights the possibility that 
presidential control can be used to advance a faction’s interest, a chief 
concern of the Framers, I do not mean to deny that President’s can use their 
power to serve rule of law values instead.  This Article will later contrast 
this patronage state theory with the duty-based theory’s narrower 
conception of the proper scope of presidential influence over the officials 
executing the law.  The patronage state theory constitutes a central element 
of the larger theory of the unitary executive.31    
 Justice Scalia justifies this control, in part, by endorsing a 
presidential prerogative to make political decisions about prosecution.  
Justice Scalia describes prosecutorial discretion as involving a balance of 
“legal, practical, and political” considerations.32  Prosecutors must balance 
these factors, writes Scalia, in deciding whether to prosecute “technical 
violation[s]” at all.33  He then claims that the Constitution lodges control 
over prosecutorial discretion, including decisions about when not to 
prosecute violations, in the President.34  Moreover, Justice Scalia envisions 
an executive branch “attuned to the interests and policies of the 
Presidency.”35   
                                                                                                                            
Justice Scalia also emphasizes the separation of powers principle that each department must 
have “defense . . . commensurate to the danger of attack.”  Id. at 704.  Justice Scalia applies 
this principle to the executive branch, which he sees as under attack in Morrison.  See id. at 
703 (criticizing the statute for commencing investigations without the assent of the 
“President or his authorized subordinates.”).  He identifies the Constitutional need to defend 
the executive branch as giving “comprehensible content to the Appointments Clause. . .” Id. 
at 704.  And this content leads him to reject the majority’s decision to uphold judicial 
appointment of the independent counsel.  See id. at 713.  
30
 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926) (explaining that Congressional 
opposition to a custom or presidential removal arose in response to the “use of patronage for 
political purposes”); HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES:  SEPARATION OF POWERS 
LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 408-09 (2006) (describing President Jackson’s 
introduction of the policy of wholesale removal of holdover appointees as an innovation 
justified as serving democracy that soon “degenerated into a spoils system of patronage and 
cronyism”).  Cf. John Yoo, Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B. U. L. REV. 421, 425-26 
(2008) (citing Jefferson’s introduction of the spoils system–the practice of rewarding 
supporters with offices in the government—as an effort to assert personal presidential 
control over “all law enforcement.”) 
31
 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 16, at 4 (characterizing Presidential claims of removal 
power as decisive evidence that Presidents “have believed in the theory of the unitary 
executive”).  
32
 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 708 [emphasis added] (describing the balancing of these factors as 
“the very essence of prosecutorial discretion”). 
33
 Id. 
34
 Id. (stating that taking control of this balancing from the President “remove[s] the core of 
the prosecutorial function” from “presidential control.”).  Accord Friends of the Earth v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 528 U.S. 167, 209-210 (2000) (suggesting that the President’s duty to 
faithfully execute the law requires him to be able to decide to refrain from prosecuting 
violators of environmental statutes).  Cf. Johnsen, supra note 8, at 1594-95 (explaining that 
nonenforcement of statutes can undermine the rule of law). 
35
 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712. 
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 I will refer to this idea that the President must have exclusive 
control over the politics of executive branch decision-making as the unitary 
executive theory’s “political dimension.”  Notice that this political 
dimension empowers the President to exercise more power than is strictly 
necessary to assure faithful execution of the law.36  In a situation in which 
an executive branch official must choose between two actions, both of 
which comply with the law, the “political dimension” insists that the sitting 
President’s political preference becomes the determining factor in making 
the decision.37   
 This political dimension of the unitary executive theory lies at the 
heart of the unitary executive theory’s tendency to undermine the rule of 
law.  This problem arises because the President and loyal subordinates may 
support policies in considerable tension with the law they should administer.  
The political dimension, the idea that the President’s policy preferences 
must govern administration, can lead to opportunistic construction of the 
law, which can distort it.38  While neither Justice Scalia nor the leading 
academic proponents of the unitary executive theory endorse perversion of 
statutes, the political dimension of the unitary executive theory can 
significantly undermine the rule of law.   
 The Court has rejected the unitary executive theory on numerous 
occasions.39  Yet, the rejected theory has profoundly influenced executive 
branch conduct, much of it either unreviewable judicially or reviewable 
                                                   
36
 See 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 472 (1841) (recognizing that an officer honestly exercising 
discretion within statutory bounds faithfully executes law).  Cf. U.S. CONST.  art. II, § 3 
(requiring the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”). 
37
 See Saikrishna Banglagore Prakash, Hail to the Chief  Administrator:  The Framers and 
the President’s Administrative Power, 102 YALE L. J. 991, 992 (1993) (opining that 
whenever a statute grants an executive branch official discretion, the Constitution authorizes 
the President to “control that discretion.”) 
38
 Accord EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT:  OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957, 80-81 (1957) 
(opining that allowing the President to substitute his own judgment for that of any agency 
would convert all law enforcement questions into discretionary questions controlled by “an 
independent and legally uncontrollable branch of government”); see, e.g., SAVAGE, supra 
note 10 (detailing numerous instances where the Bush administration distorted law in order 
to enhance the President’s power and carry out a militant policy to counter terrorism). 
39
 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690 n. 29 (1988) (rejecting the dissent’s view that 
blanket executive removal authority can be inferred from the Article II Vesting Clause); 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 738-39 & nn. 1-3 (1986) (White J., dissenting) (approving 
of the majority’s decision not to endorse the theory that all executive officers must be 
subject to presidential removal at will); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 
602, 628-29 (1935) (rejecting an illimitable power of the President to remove officers 
carrying out quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 
349, 355-56 (1948) (upholding a Congressional decision to insulate a War Claims 
Commission from presidential control); United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 484-85 
(1886) (expressing “no doubt” that Congress may prohibit the President from removing 
inferior officers); Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S.  (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838) (holding that 
when the Congress imposes a duty upon an executive officer, the law, rather than the 
President, controls the exercise of that duty). 
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only in a very deferential sense.40  And recent appointments to the Court 
may make it more receptive to the theory in the future.41  In the meantime, 
Justice Scalia’s dissent rekindled academic debate about the theory.42 
 Scholars supporting Justice Scalia’s view have emphasized 
intertextual considerations,43 which the duty-based theory emphasizes as 
well.  The most important of these intertextual arguments for purposes of 
understanding the duty-based alternative concerns the relationship between 
the Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause, which requires that the 
President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”44  These scholars 
argue that in order to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” the 
President must control all officials administering law.45 
 Generally, unitary executive proponents support originalism, the 
idea that the Constitutions’ Framers’ intentions should govern the resolution 
of contemporary Constitutional questions.46  Accordingly, Justice Scalia and 
his academic supporters rely on the Framers’ intent to help justify the 
unitary executive theory.  This history shows that the Framers specifically 
rejected the notion of a committee heading the executive branch of 
government in favor of a single executive, hence the phrase “unitary 
executive.”47  These originalists have also attempted to bolster the case for 
                                                   
40
 See SAVAGE, supra note 10 (offering an exhaustive account of its role in executive branch 
decisionmaking); Devins, supra note 13, at 273 (stating that “perceptions about unitariness 
define White House control of the administrative state.”). 
41
 See SAVAGE, supra note 10, at 254, 271 (noting Justices Roberts and Alito’s support for 
expanding executive power prior to their elevation to the bench). 
42
 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Essay, The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and 
the Hamdan Opinion:  A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 
1022 (2007) (stating that the President can supervise and control principal officers and veto 
any inferior officer’s decision); Percival, supra note 14 (arguing against application of the 
unitary executive theory to officials that have received delegated authority from Congress); 
A Michael Froomkin, The Imperial President’s New Vestments, 88 NW U. L. REV. 1346, 
1348 (1994) (stating that “unitarians” believe that the Constitution requires that the President 
have the power to countermand and fire all executive branch officials); Calabresi & Prakash, 
supra note 12, at 593–99 (describing the unitary executive theory as demanding complete 
presidential control over all executive branch officials and discussing required control 
mechanisms); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 13 , at 4 (characterizing the unitary executive 
theory as a “myth”); Calabresi &  Rhodes, supra note 13 (claiming that many arguments 
made about Article III support the unitary executive theory of Article II); Harold J. Krent, 
Fragmenting the Unitary Executive:  Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority 
Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 73 (1990) (stating that the Supreme 
Court has recognized presidential removal authority in order to “preserve a unitary 
executive”). 
43
 See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 570-99 (discussing various intertextual 
arguments).  
44
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
45
 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 583. 
46
 See id. at 546 n. 11 (pointing out that originalists have tended to support the unitary 
executive theory in recent years). 
47
 See infra nn. 155-158 and accompanying text; Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 698-99 
(1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (describing the decision to vest the executive power in a single 
President as a reflecting deliberate rejection of proposals for multiple executives or a council 
of advisers).   
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the unitary executive theory by looking at post-enactment practice.48  
Because both the early presidents and many of the members of the first 
Congress were among those involved in ratifying the Constitution, their 
actions may provide clues to the Framers’ intention.  While unitarians argue 
that the available evidence of Framers’ intent both prior to and subsequent 
to enactment of the Constitution supports their case, they argue strenuously 
that text governs and that the Framers’ intentions are only relevant in 
helping resolve textual ambiguities.49  The duty-based theory relies heavily 
on text and only secondarily upon history, in keeping with this approach. 
 
III.  THE DUTY-BASED THEORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER 
 This section begins with an elaboration of the of the duty-based 
theory’s central claims.  It then discusses the relevant evidence for 
evaluating the theory’s soundness, beginning with constitutional text, and, 
with minor exceptions, introducing history only later.  Because of my desire 
to focus primarily upon original intent, most of the case law presentation 
occurs in part IV as part of the discussion of the duty-based theory’s 
implications for existing law. 
 
A.  Duty’s Primacy 
 The Constitution, as unitarians recognize, seeks to establish a rule of 
law through a scheme of separated powers.50  A rule of law implies that all 
officials in the executive branch of government must obey the laws that 
Congress enacts under the Constitution.  Congress passes many laws with 
the President’s concurrence.  But it passes some, as it were, over his dead 
body, i.e. by overriding a veto.51  Whether the President likes the law or not, 
the founders wanted the President and all other executive branch officials to 
obey it.52   
 A central problem the Framers faced in designing the new 
government’s executive branch was how to configure government to 
encourage this obedience to law.  The founders wished to check the natural 
                                                   
48
 See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 635-662; Saikrishna Prakash, New Light 
on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1075 (2006) (arguing that the 
Congressional debates over the Decision of 1789 evinced majority support for a Presidential 
removal power). 
49
 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 550 (arguing that originalists only resort to 
historical argument when an ambiguity exists). 
50
 See Morrison 487 U.S. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (identifying the rule of law with 
separation of powers). 
51
 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (authorizing 2/3 of the Congress to override a Presidential 
veto). 
52
 See generally WALTER E. DELLINGER ET AL., PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE OFFICE OF LEGAL 
COUNSEL, reprinted in 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 app. 2, at 1604 (2007) (discussing the 
President’s “constitutional obligation to ensure the legality of executive action.”); 
Ackerman, supra note 9, at 712 (suggesting that the President’s role in lawmaking conflicts 
with his duty to take care that the law be faithfully executed). 
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tendency of Presidents and other executive branch officials to act according 
to their own personal or political preferences, but many of them feared 
making the executive branch completely subject to congressional caprice as 
much as others feared monarchy.  The founders were familiar with the idea 
of allegiance to a person; English law had long required an oath swearing 
allegiance to the King.53  But they sought to establish something different, 
allegiance to the law.54    
 The Constitution addresses this need by explicitly creating duties 
applicable to both the President and all other executive branch officials to 
obey the law.   These duties, as we shall see, require lower executive branch 
officials to disobey illegal presidential orders in order to allow them to 
check presidential abuse.55   
 The Constitution reinforces the duty to obey law by dividing control 
over the executive branch of government between the President and 
Congress.  Rather than create the patronage state, the Framers rejected the 
idea of unilateral presidential control over appointment and removal, instead 
adopted provisions providing for Senatorial removal and substantial 
congressional involvement in the appointment of officers.  Indeed, a leading 
proponent of executive power, Alexander Hamilton, specifically praised the 
Constitution’s decision to deny the President a removal power as a force for 
stability in administration during the ratification debates.56 
 The Constitution envisions presidential leadership and a dialogue 
between somewhat independent officials and the President about 
appropriate exercises of discretion within a rule of law framework.  It does 
not provide presidential power to completely control officials.   
 The Framers contemplated a much more modest role for presidential 
power than exists today.  The Founders did not view the President as a 
major domestic policy-maker, leaving that job to Congress.  The utter lack 
of originalist support for the political dimension of the unitary executive 
theory fatally undermines the theory as a whole.57  Since the President never 
could execute all law himself or even personally direct each action that 
other executive branch officials take, the unitary executive theory’s 
insistence on presidential control of the executive branch must be 
                                                   
53
 See Enid Campbell, Oaths and Affirmations of Public Office Under English Law:  An 
Historical Retrospect, 21 J. LEG. HIST. 1 (2000) (detailing the history of oath taking in 
England). 
54
 Cf. Thomas C. Grey, Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1984) (explaining 
that the Oath Clause aimed to establish allegiance to the Constitution in much the same way 
that religious oaths sought to establish allegiance to a church). 
55
 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 171 (1803) (stating that the President 
may not lawfully forbid an executive officer from carrying out acts required by law). 
56
 See infra notes 168-171 and accompanying text. 
57
 See Richard J. Pierce Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from The Who Would 
Abuse it:  A Review of the Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher Yoo, 
__ U. PENN. J. CONST. L. ___, 3 (2009) (forthcoming) (describing the unitary executive 
theory as the “belief . . . that the Vesting Clause of Article II confers on the President 
plenary power over policy making by all Executive Branch . . . officials”) (emphasis added).   
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understood as a metaphor.58  Implicitly recognizing this, unitarians extend 
the control metaphor by insisting on the President putting in place 
subordinates, in Justice Scalia’s words, “attuned to the interests and policies 
of the Presidency.”59  The Framers, however, did not expect the President to 
act as a policy-maker in executing the law and specifically sought to check 
his ability to advance his own interests by denying him the ability to select 
his subordinates without substantial legislative control.  They viewed 
Congress as the chief policy-maker and viewed the President as the “Chief 
Magistrate,” i.e. as the principal officer who must obey and properly carry 
out the law.   
 We shall see that the text and contemporaneous history powerfully 
support the duty-based theory.   The provisions most directly speaking to 
the relationship between the executive branch and lower government 
officials embrace duty and reject unilateral presidential control over the 
executive branch, a reading confirmed unequivocally by the pre-ratification 
history.  Early post-enactment history reflects a consensus favoring the 
duty-based theory and division on questions of presidential control.  The 
text and contemporaneous history together establish that the ratifiers’ intent 
favors the duty-based theory and that contemporary unitary executive theory 
is a non-originalist attempt to smuggle modern notions of expansive 
Presidential power into the Constitution.   
 
B.  Constitutional Text 
  A proper reading of the constitutional text requires consideration of 
the whole text.  Taken together, the text strongly supports the duty-based 
theory.    
 1.  Clauses Establishing Duties — The Constitution addresses the 
need to create a duty to obey the law in a very straightforward manner—by 
imposing duties on the President and other executive branch officials 
directed at securing fidelity to the law.  The text includes both a “Take Care 
Clauses” and two Oath Clauses creating these duties.  
(a)  The Take Care Clause — The Take Care Clause establishes the 
first relevant presidential duty.  It requires the President to “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed.”60  This clause does not require the 
President to execute the law himself, for the simple reason that even in 
George Washington’s time this was impossible.61  Accordingly, the Framers 
                                                   
58
 See Devins, supra note 13, at 275 (characterizing the administration as too immense for 
the White House “to comprehensively coordinate policymaking”).   
59
 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 712 (1988).  Cf. Devins, supra note 13, at 276 
(explaining that a President can appoint “like-minded individuals” in order to “place his 
imprimatur on government operations”).   
60
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
61
 See II FARRAND, supra note 2, at 53-54 (affirming that the Executive “can do nothing of 
consequence” without the “great ministers” of war, foreign affairs, etc.); Myers v. United 
States, 272 U.S. 56, 117 (1926) (recognizing that the President “alone and unaided” cannot 
execute the laws); see, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists:  Federal 
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employed the passive voice, implying that unnamed people other than the 
President would execute the law.62  Nor does the clause require the 
President to “assure” that these other people faithfully implement the law.  
Instead, it more mildly admonishes him to “take Care” that others execute 
the law properly.  The choice of the Take Care Clause’s mild admonishment 
over the language of control suggests that the President must employ his 
best effort to encourage faithful law execution, but acknowledges that he 
lacks the power to assure faithful execution of the law himself.63 
 (b) The Oath Clause — The Constitution supplements this effort to 
make the President into a force for executive branch fidelity to law with a 
requirement of a presidential oath.  It requires him upon assuming office to 
promise to “faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, 
and . . . to the best of [his] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States.”64  This presidential Oath Clause suggests 
an effort to employ the President’s sense of honor and duty as an instrument 
in securing fidelity to law.65  This clause’s existence suggests that the 
Framers believed that a President who publicly promises to defend the 
Constitution is more likely to do so.66   
 Since the Constitution recognizes that executive branch officials 
other than the President must implement the law, it seeks to secure their 
fidelity to law as well.  Importantly, in a break with the monarchial tradition 
                                                                                                                            
Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era,1801-1829, 116 YALE L. J. 
1636, 1667 (2007) (pointing out that because President Jefferson “could not micromanage” 
enforcement of the embargo Congress imposed, the Treasury Department provided much of 
the enforcement policy’s content); Letter from George Washington to Eleanor Francois Elie, 
Conte de Mousier (May 25, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, June 
1788-Jan. 1790, at 333-34 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed. 1939) (acknowledging the 
“impossibility” of “one man” perfoming “all the great business of the State” as the 
rationale for creating Departments and their officers). 
62
 See BRUFF, supra note 30, at 455 (stating that the “passive mood” of the Take Care clause 
signals that the President superintends others’ activities); Thomas O McGarity, Presidential 
Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 465-66 (1987) 
(claiming that the “Take Care Clause” envisions others executing the law); Prakash, supra 
note 37, at 993 (acknowledging that “[t]he Framers recognized that the President could not 
execute federal law alone.”)  
63
 See 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624 (1823) (interpreting the Take Care Clause as precluding the 
President from overturning a Treasury Department decision). Cf. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. 
Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1102 (9th Cir. 1987) (explaining that the duty to faithfully execute 
the law does not include a power to decline to enforce valid statutes); Strauss, Agencies, 
supra note 13, at 648-650 (finding the clause consistent with vesting decisionmaking 
authority in administrative agencies); BRUFF, supra note 30, at 456 (approving an Attorney 
General Opinion saying that the President could order a federal prosecutor to dismiss a case 
with foreign affairs implications, because the President “makes our foreign policy.”) 
64
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
65
 See Grey, supra note 54, at 18 (describing the oath clause as a “ritual of allegiance” 
substituting for a religious oath); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES § 1843 (1833) (finding that the oath imposed ”solemn obligation[s] . 
. especially upon those . . . who fe[lt] a deep sense of accountability to” God). 
66
 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 221-22 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (stating that the “sanctity” of the oath will bind all officers to obey federal law). 
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of fealty to an individual head of government, it does not try to secure their 
personal loyalty to the President.  Instead of requiring executive branch 
officials to swear an oath pledging fealty to the President, the Constitution 
requires “all executive officers . .  . [to] be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to 
support this Constitution.”67  This General Oath Clause even more strongly 
suggests an effort to employ individual honor and duty, this time in officials 
other than the President, as forces encouraging fidelity to the law.68  It 
explicitly views the required promise of allegiance to the Constitution as 
binding the official making the oath or affirmation.  
 It remains to spell out the implications of these duties to the 
Constitution.  The presidential duty to “preserve, protect, and defend the 
Constitution” has a lot in common with the other officials’ duty to “support” 
the Constitution.69  The notion of protecting and supporting a Constitution 
both imply an obligation to obey it.  The Constitution needs support and 
protection in the sense of obedience, so that it can establish a rule of law.  
Thus, these oaths create duties for all executive branch officials to obey the 
Constitution.   
Obviously, this obedience duty prevents executive branch officials 
from trampling upon rights established in the Constitution.  Thus, for 
example, an officer who swears such an oath should feel duty bound not to 
take property of citizens without just compensation and due process, for the 
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits such actions.70  But this 
obedience duty is broader than just the duty to avoid trampling on 
constitutional rights.  For the Constitution also establishes the process for 
making and implementing the law.  The obligation to uphold these parts of 
the Constitution imply an obligation to comply with laws enacted under the 
Constitution.71   
                                                   
67
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.  This Oath Clause applies not only to “all executive . . . Officers 
of the United States,” but also to all state and federal officials.  Id.   
68
 See II FARRAND, supra note 2, at 551 (recounting Governor Morris’ statement supporting 
allowing the Senate to impeach a President for a misdemeanor because “there could be no 
danger that the Senate would say untruly on their oaths that the President was guilty of 
crimes”). 
69
 Accord  DAVID WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:  ITS HISTORY, 
APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION 910 (1910) (quoting Thomas Jefferson as stating that the 
presidential oath substantively replicated the general oath). 
70
 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
71
 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924-25, 943 (1997) (majority and dissenting 
opinions) (recognizing that the Oath Clause requires officials to implement constitutional 
federal statutes).  Accord Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President to Do?  Interpreting the 
Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U.L. REV. 395, 412-14 (2008) 
(explaining why the President’s duty to “preserve protect, and defend” the Constitution 
requires him to enforce statutes properly, unless they blatantly violate the constitution under 
Supreme Court precedent).  Saikrishna Prakash points out that the General Oath Clause, 
unlike the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, does not explicitly mention federal 
law.  See Saikrishna B. Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1992-93 
(1993).  Yet, the Framers and the Anti-Federalists clearly understood the oath as binding 
state officials to enforce federal statutes.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander 
Hamilton), supra note 66, at 221-22 (explaining that the oath, by binding all state and 
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 Accordingly, the General Oath Clause requires federal officials to 
disobey the President when he orders them to violate the law.72  To that 
extent, at least, the Constitution rejects presidential control over the 
executive branch of government, setting up individuals within the executive 
branch of government as checks on presidential abuse.73  This is a necessary 
implication of a clause that requires fidelity to the law, rather than fidelity to 
the President.74 
 This implication of the Oath Clause has enormous contemporary 
relevance.  For example, a key Justice Department Official, relying on his 
Oath of Office, opposed administration efforts to authorize torture, in 
contravention of treaties, which constitute binding laws in the United States 
under the Constitution.75  Lawyers who believed that their primary loyalty 
belonged with the law, rather than with the President or Vice President, 
have moderated some recent abuses.  Fidelity to the law triggered a threat of 
mass resignations leading President Bush to narrow his illegal wiretapping 
program and, oath-based opposition, at least briefly, checked broad 
authorization of torture.76  The General Oath Clause aims to encourage these 
sorts of checks upon presidential abuse of power.   
 The presidential Oath Clause affirms the President’s lack of control 
over executive Officers, while simultaneously emphasizing the Presidents’ 
broader responsibilities to the Constitution.  While other officeholder need 
merely pledge their “support” for the Constitution, the President must 
promise to “preserve, protect, and defend it.”77  This locution includes a 
duty to obey the Constitution, but it implies a broader duty to try to prevent 
                                                                                                                            
federal officials helps make federal law supreme); Agrippa, Letter to the People (Dec. 11, 
1787), reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 78 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).  
The General Oath Clause applies to both state and federal officials, so if it requires state 
officials to enforce federal law, it must bind federal officials in that way as well.  
72
 See 1 Op Att’y Gen. 624, 625 (1823) (opining that when a statute delegates power to a 
department head, the President’s duty to faithfully execute the law precludes his interference 
with that officer’s decision). 
73
 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 41-42 (explaining that by claiming that the Geneva 
Convention protects Iraqi terrorists even though David Addington insisted that the 
President’s contrary decision not be questioned, the Office of Legal Council acted as a 
“frontline policymaker in the war on terrorism.”) 
74
 See ID. at 79-80 (recounting FBI Director  Bob Mueller’s explanation of why he felt 
“obligated to follow an OLC legal opinion even if the President disagreed.”) 
75
 See, e.g. ID. at 11 (explaining that the author decided to “fix” defective memoranda 
authorizing counterterrorism operations, because doing so “was more consistent with my 
oath of office” than resigning). 
76
 See ID. (suggesting that concerns about violating his oath led to his efforts to narrow 
torture memos); SAVAGE, supra note 10, at 184-188 (explaining how Bush authorized a 
narrowing of the warrantless wiretapping program, apparently to avoid resignations of 
officials that doubted its legality); see also Michael Isikoff,  The Fed Who Blew the Whistle, 
NEWSWEEK, December 22, 2008, 40, 42 (explaining that the employee blowing the whistle 
on warrantless wiretapping did so because he “had taken an oath to uphold the 
Constitution”); David Luban, Lawfare and Legal Ethics in Guantanamo, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1981, 2002 (2008) (describing JAGs as “stubborn rule of law defenders” against torture 
memos predicated on the unitary executive theory).   
77
 Compare U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 with art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
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others from undermining it through maladministration of the law.  Thus, the 
presidential Oath Clause reinforces the “Take Care Clause,” in effect 
requiring the President to take a public oath that he will carry out the duty 
established in the Take Care Clause.78   
 The presidential Oath Clause, however, only requires the President 
to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution “to the best of [his] 
Ability.”79  In addition to exhorting the President to make his best efforts, 
this ability limitation acknowledges that the President cannot prevent all 
abuses, because he cannot control all law execution himself.  This ability 
phrase contrasts with the part of the oath wherein the President promises to 
“faithfully execute the Office of the President.”  The ability limitation does 
not apply to this part of the oath.  This contrast signals an understanding that 
the President can wholly control his own exercise of authority, but not that 
of others.  Thus, the Take Care Clause creates a broad presidential duty 
while recognizing limits to presidential control over executive branch 
officials. 
 
 2.  Clauses Rejecting the Patronage State and Embracing Shared 
Power over the Executive Branch — While the Constitution seeks to instill 
a duty to uphold the Constitution among officeholders directly, through 
announcement of duties and the swearing of oaths, it reflects a recognition 
that this might not suffice.  Accordingly, the Constitution established 
significant elements of congressional control over the executive branch of 
government.  This is in keeping with general philosophy of separation of 
powers, that ambition must be made to check ambition.80  Congressional 
ambitions for law enforcement would check potential presidential abuse and 
help secure executive branch fidelity to the law.      
 The Constitutional does not establish the patronage state favored by 
unitarians.   The text denies the President complete control over 
appointment and removal of executive branch officials.  The Framers 
understood that the power to appoint carries with it the ability to create a 
sense of obligation among officeholders, which would serve as a source of 
presidential control.81  Similarly, the ability to remove an officer would 
serve the aim of presidential control over executive branch officials.  Yet, 
the Constitution only gives the President limited control over appointments 
                                                   
78
 A proposal from the Committee on Detail shows how closely related these two clauses 
were in the eyes of their drafters: 
 
(He shall take Care to the best of his Ability, that the Laws) (It shall be his duty to 
provide for the due and faithful exed- of the Laws) of the United States (be 
faithfully executed) (to the best of his ability). 
 
II FARRAND, supra note 2, at 171.   
79
 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
80
 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (Madison), supra note 66, at 322. 
81
 See infra nn. 166165-167 and accompanying text (showing an understanding that 
unilateral Presidential control of appointments would lead to appointment of quislings). 
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and contains not a single word authorizing the President to remove 
executive branch officials from their offices under any circumstances.82   
 (a) The Appointments Clause — The Appointments Clause 
authorizes the Senate to reject presidential nominations of high executive 
branch officials.  It empowers the President to nominate “Officers of the 
United States” and other high ranking officials, but only to appoint them 
“with the Advise and Consent of the Senate.”83  The Senate can use this 
power to reject presidential favorites not likely to faithfully carry out the 
laws the Senate helps enact.84  This means that the highest ranking officials, 
while surely feeling some loyalty to the President who nominates them, also 
owe their appointment to United States Senators.     
 The Appointments Clause also allows the Congress to take the 
appointment of “inferior Officers” away from the President entirely by 
expressly authorizing Congress to vest the appointments power in Article III 
judges,85 who have life tenure and may have been appointed by a political 
opponent of a sitting President.  This congressional authority to vest judges 
with an appointment power figured prominently in Morrison, which 
adjudicated, among other things, the constitutionality of an Ethics in 
Government Act provision that lodged the power to appoint an independent 
counsel in a panel of Article III judges.86  The Court upheld this provision, 
relying on the language authorizing Congress to delegate appointment 
authority to judges.87  The Appointments Clause also authorizes the vesting 
of the authority to appoint inferior officers in the President or heads of 
departments, but it leaves Congress with the choice of whether to allow for 
direct presidential control (presidential appointment), the possibility of 
presidential influence (heads of departments), or no presidential control at 
all (the judiciary).88  The provision authorizing Congress to control who gets 
to appoint inferior officers allows Congress to lodge the appointment power 
in the person most likely to hire inferior officers who will faithfully execute 
the law.89  This clause shows that the Constitution does not give the 
                                                   
82
 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 16, at 4 (characterizing the removal power as an 
“implied” power).   
83
 U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
84
 See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1975) (describing the Senate as “a 
participant in the appointive (sic) process by virtue of its authority to refuse to confirm” the 
President’s nominees). 
85
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
86
 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–76 (1988) (explaining why 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) 
does not violate the Appointments Clause when it provides for judicial appointment of an 
independent counsel). 
87
 See id. at 673–77 (rejecting an argument against interbranch appointments, primarily 
because the appointments clause expressly authorizes Congress to vest the appointment of 
“inferior officers” in the courts). 
88
 See id. at 673 (stating that the Appointments Clause gives Congress “significant 
discretion" in choosing where it wants to vest the authority to appoint inferior officers); U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
89
 Cf. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1879) (affirming Congress’ discretionary 
authority to choose the locus of the appointment power, but suggesting that Congress should 
favor the department of government in which the official is to be located).  
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President complete control over the executive Branch of government, 
thereby undermining the unitary executive theory.90    
 (b) The Removal Clause — The Constitutional text provides for 
congressional control over the removal of officers and contains not a word 
authorizing presidential removal for any reason.  More specifically, it 
provides for removal from office of “civil Officers of the United States on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors.”91  Thus, it authorizes removal for the kind of 
corruption that the Framers viewed as the greatest threat to the rule of law.92  
The Constitution assigns the Senate the duty to try impeachments and 
requires a 2/3 vote in order to convict an impeached officer.93  The Framers’ 
debates about Article II focus heavily upon concerns about abuse of 
power.94  They decided that somebody must control executive officers in 
cases of abuse.  But they chose, not the President, but the Senate, to perform 
this function of controlling executive branch officials.      
 The Removal Clause sets out a “finely wrought” procedure95 for 
these trials, requiring Senators “sitting” for the purpose of impeachment to 
“be on Oath or Affirmation” and requiring the Chief Justice to preside in the 
case of a presidential impeachment.96  Furthermore, the Constitution 
specifies impeachment’s consequences, namely removal from office and a 
bar on assuming any other office in the federal government.97  It goes on to 
deny that impeachment has any other consequences, but affirms that an 
impeached officeholder can by tried criminally in a regular court for his 
offence.98 
 Since the Constitution contains only a single “finely wrought” 
procedure for removing executive branch officials from office, one might 
well infer that this procedure is exclusive.  Under this reading, the President 
may never remove an officeholder prior to expiration of his term in office; 
only the Senate can do that, through impeachment.   And this is precisely 
the way some of those who participated in framing the Constitution read it, 
                                                   
90
 Accord Froomkin, Note, supra note 14, at 799; see Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 13, at 
1181 (recognizing that the Inferior Officers Clause both curtails the Presidents’ appointment 
power and recognizes “Heads of Departments” as having a place in the constitutional 
design); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 674–75 (noting that the Framers rejected attempts to transfer 
the authority to appoint inferior officers to the President).  
91
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
92
 See II FARRAND, supra note 2, at 65-66 (recounting Madison’s support for making the 
President impeachable, because he might “pervert his administration into a scheme of 
peculation or oppression[,] . . . betray his trust to foreign powers”, or “lose his capacity.”) 
93
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
94
 See MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS:  A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 17 (2000) (describing avoiding abuse of power as the primary 
goal of the Appointments Clause debate). 
95
 Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (treating the “finely wrought” procedure of 
bicameralism and presentment explicitly set out in the Constitution as the exclusive means 
of passing legislation).   
96
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.  
97
 ID. 
98
 ID., cl. 7. 
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when this subject arose during the First Congress, as Professors Calabresi 
and Prakash, both leading unitarians, admit.99 
 The modern Court, of course, has never prohibited Congress from 
adding removal procedures not specified in the Constitution.  And Congress 
has done so for a very long time.   
 Intertextual considerations do not support this tradition of allowing 
Congress to supplement the Constitution’s sole removal procedure.  Article 
III provides lifetime tenure for federal judges, absent impeachment.100  The 
failure of Article II to specify that executive branch officials likewise enjoy 
lifetime tenure (absent impeachment) seems, at first glance, to make the 
inference that Congress can provide for their removal by means other than 
impeachment reasonable.101  On the other hand, an assumption that 
Congress has authority to limit executive branch officials’ term of office but 
not to provide for removal prior to the expiration of a term except via 
impeachment makes the Impeachment Clause’s exclusivity consistent with 
Article III.102  Thus, the contrast with Article III provides no intertextual 
support for the notion that Congress may supplement the Constitution’s sole 
explicit removal procedure.  
 Supplementing the Constitution with new removal provisions, 
however, can make it possible to remove officeholders for failures not 
amounting to high crimes and misdemeanors.  For example, Congress could 
make consistent failure to implement a statute grounds for removal (and has 
often done so).  Removal procedures that allow this would serve rule of law 
values at the heart of the duty-based theory, but enjoy no explicit textualist 
support. 
 The Constitution’s failure to explicitly provide for removal except in 
cases of criminal misconduct shows, at a minimum, that the Framers did not 
consider the authority to fire non-criminal officials sufficiently important to 
the rule of law to  explicitly authorize it in the Constitution.  The 
Constitution’s language implies that a sense of honor and duty to the law 
and gratitude to the many officials entitled to participate in appointments 
would act as forces impelling officials to properly execute the law.  In 
addition, the possibility of judicial review, presidential cajoling, and 
congressional oversight create additional pressures to secure faithful 
execution of the law.  Removal for non-criminal malfeasance, while 
                                                   
99
 See I ANNALS OF CONG. 457 (1789) (Joseph Gales, ed., 1834) (statement of Mr. Smith) 
(contending that the Constitution’s impeachment provision implies that impeachment is the 
only “mode” of removal from office); Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers, 
30 WM & MARY L. REV. 211, 234 (1989) (describing the position that “Removal was 
possible only by means of impeachment” as one of the major positions taken in the 1789 
debate over creation of departments in the executive branch of government); Calabresi & 
Prakash, supra note 12, at 642–43 (noting that some in the First Congress supported the idea 
that impeachment was the sole constitutionally permissible method of removing an officer). 
100
 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that Judges “shall hold their Offices during good 
behavior). 
101
 See Prakash, supra note 48, at 1035 (asking why the Framers would have specified life 
tenure for judges if all officers could serve for life). 
102
 See id. n. 101 (suggesting a similar position). 
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potentially useful in advancing the rule of law, may not be constitutionally 
required, or even permissible under the constitutional text. 
 The Constitution’s failure to explicitly provide for removal for 
disobedience to the President also suggests that the Constitution does not 
require the creation of a patronage state.  If the Framers considered 
presidential control over executive branch officials important, they did not 
consider the ability to fire disobedient officials sufficiently essential to 
maintaining this control to justify express inclusion of such a power in the 
Constitution.  Instead, the Constitution uses shared power and duty to secure 
fidelity to law.  Certainly, the Constitution’s appointment and removal 
provisions do not create the patronage state.   
 (c) Vesting of Power in Departments— Both proponents and 
opponents of the unitary executive theory agree that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause empowers Congress to create executive branch departments 
and offices and to assign them duties.103  This clause authorizes Congress 
“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department 
or Officer thereof.”104  This language states that the Constitution vests 
powers in departments and officers, not just the President.105  This reading 
of this Article I Vesting Clause precludes reading the Article II Vesting 
Clause as an exclusive grant of power.106 
                                                   
103
 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 592 (agreeing that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause creates Congressional authority to create executive offices and to assign duties to 
carry out statutorily specified tasks); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 13, at 69 (interpreting 
the Necessary and Proper Clause to allow Congress to “specify the means by which the laws 
were to be executed”); Strauss, Agencies, supra note 13, at 598-99 (inferring from the 
paucity of Constitution’s description of the President’s powers an intention to leave the “job 
of creating . . . the” federal government’s shape to Congress under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause).  See also II FARRAND, supra note 2, at 345 (showing that Madison and Pinkney 
proposed to specifically provide that Congress can “establish all offices,” but that many 
members considered this as unnecessary, as the power was clearly implied by the Necessary 
and Proper Clause); William W. Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining 
Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts:  Comment on the Horizontal 
Effect of the Sweeping Clause, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring 1976, 102, 107, 118 
(arguing that the Necessary and Proper clause suggests limits on implied presidential 
power). 
104
 U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 18. 
105
 Accord Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 610 (1838) (affirming Congress’ 
power to “impose upon any executive officer any duty they [sic] may think proper.”); 
Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F. Cas. 355, 356 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) No. 5, 420) 
(Congress may vest final decisionmaking authority in an inferior officer). 
106
 See Williams v. United States, 1 How. 290, 297 (1843) (declaring that the President’s 
duty to superintend administration “cannot require him to become the administrative officer 
to every department” lest he “absorb” the various departments’ duties).  See, e.g., 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (affirming the constitutionality of 
Congressional creation of an independent national bank under the necessary and proper 
clause).  Professors Calabresi and Rhodes argue that the Necessary and Proper clause 
authorizes the creation of executive branch offices, but does not authorize Congressional 
delegation of executive power to such offices.  Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 13, at 1184 
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 The Opinions Clause confirms that department heads have 
responsibility to execute the law.  It empowers the President to “require the 
Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive 
Departments, upon any subject relating to the Duties of their respective 
Offices.”  Notice that this clause confirms that department heads have 
duties.  The clause undermines the idea that the Vesting Clause empowers 
the President to fully control executive officers.  If it did, there would be no 
need for a clause giving the President power to get a written opinion from a 
cabinet member.107  The felt need for an explicit power grant to simply get a 
written opinion suggests an expectation that department heads would 
sometimes have substantial scope for independent operation.       
 Thus, the Constitution’ removal provision (the Impeachment 
Clause), the Appointments Clause, the Oath Clauses, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, and the Opinions Clause give non-presidential actors a role 
in controlling the execution of government power.108  Unitarians seek to 
overcome the specifics in the directly relevant clauses, those that explicitly 
address elements of control over the executive branch, by arguing that 
complete presidential control must be implied from a more general clause, 
namely the Vesting Clause.  This approach contradicts the principle that 
ordinarily provisions in a document directly bearing on a subject qualify 
more general provisions.109   In any case, we now turn to the Vesting 
Clause, the textual linchpin of the unitary executive theory.     
 3.  The Article II Vesting Clause — The proper interpretation of 
Article II’s Vesting Clause accepts presidential influence on behalf of the 
rule of law, but rejects the theory of the patronage state.  While it is 
plausible to read the Vesting Clause in isolation as creating complete 
control, it is not plausible to read it that way in light of all of the textual 
evidence that others also have a role in controlling executive branch 
decisions.110 
                                                                                                                            
n. 158.  But this Vesting Clause states that the Constitution, not the President, vests 
departments with powers.  Since this Vesting Clause appears in conjunction with language 
in Article I authorizing Congress to create departments, this Clause is best read as 
authorizing Congress to give the officers it creates specific powers.       
107
 See Froomkin, Note, supra note 14, at 800-01; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 13, at 32-
36, 38 providing elaboration of this basic point); THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander 
Hamilton), supra note 66, at 447 (characterizing the clause as “mere redundancy”).    
108
 Indeed, a series of early attorney general opinions stated that when Congress vested 
responsibility in a federal officer to perform a duty, the President may not make relevant 
decisions in her stead.  1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 625 (183); 2 Opp. Att’y Gen. 507 (1832); 4 
Opp. Att’y Gen. 515, 516 (1846); 6 Opp. Att’y Gen. 226 (1853);13 Opp. Att’y Gen. 28 
(1869).  Contra Letter from Attorney General Caesar A. Rodney to President Thomas 
Jefferson (July 15, 1808), reprinted in 10 F. Cas 357-59 (courts may not order an officer to 
disobey a presidential order); 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 453, 469-70 (1855).   
109
 See Townsend v. Little, 109 U.S. 504, 512 (1883) (describing the rule that specific 
provisions qualify general provisions as a “well-settled rule”). 
110
 See Froomkin Note, supra note 14, at 793 n. 31 (claiming that the Vesting Clause derives 
its meaning from the Constitution’s “full text.”). 
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 Unitarians read the language vesting “the Executive power” with the 
President as vesting “all” executive power with the President.  Yet, the word 
“all” comes from Justice Scalia’s Morrison dissent, not from the 
Constitution itself.  The omission of the word “all” from Article II appears 
deliberate.  Article I vests in the Congress “All legislative Powers herein 
granted.”111  By contrast, Article II vests in the President “the Executive 
power.”112  The omission reflects recognition of the President’s inability to 
exercise all of the executive power himself, so that others must execute the 
law.  The Vesting Clause gives the President very significant power, but 
does not deny others an important role in executing the law.  The 
Constitution denies the President complete control over the executive 
branch, precisely in order to assure that competing forces coalesce to foster 
a rule of law, rather than allowing a single faction to capture the actual 
implementation of law.   
  The President exercises executive power through legitimate requests 
that lower ranking officials will generally honor.113  Their Oath requires 
them to support the Constitution.  The Constitution provides for the election 
of the President and gives him executive power.114  They must, therefore, 
carefully consider his requests in light of his political stature and his 
executive power.115  These provisions assure that executive branch officials 
will generally honor legitimate requests involving the exercise of purely 
executive power, even if no power to remove them existed.116  But these 
officials are also bound to support the Constitution themselves.  Therefore, 
they must refuse improper requests.     
 During most periods, this is precisely how government operates.117  
No good organization relies heavily on threats of dismissal as a means of 
                                                   
111
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).  
112
 ID. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
113
 The duty-based vision of presidential execution through influence, rather than complete 
control, closely tracks Peter Strauss’ distinction between presidential execution through 
oversight and performance.  See Strauss, Overseer, supra note 13 (setting out this 
conception and defending it at length). 
114
 See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
115
 See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Power to Administer the Laws, 106 
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 315 (2006) (arguing that agencies should only reject presidential 
requests for “very good reasons”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of 
Deference:  A Preliminary Inquiry into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 
506, 522 (2005) (arguing that agencies should generally defer to presidential direction unless 
the directives take them outside of their statutory authority).   
116
 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 36-39 (arguing that the Office of Legal Counsel 
properly tilts toward the President’s views in close cases and tries to serves its ends, while 
affirming a duty to check illegal executive branch initiatives); Ackerman, supra note 9, at 
660 (arguing that the President’s election means that “no cabinet secretary ever imagines 
himself operating on the same plane of legitimacy as his boss.”) 
117
 See Stack, supra note 115, at 294 (pointing out that “agency heads generally have a sense 
of loyalty to the President or commitment to the President’s policies.”). 
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assuring fidelity to its mission.118  Instead, sound governance instills a sense 
of duty and mission, exactly as the Founders did when they inserted the 
Oath Clauses.   
 A sense of duty to the President probably explains why United 
States Attorneys, whom the Bush Administration ultimately fired, agreed to 
the Administration’s request that they review voting rights cases.119  If the 
President made this request, he did exercise “executive power” and their 
agreement to invest substantial time in examining these cases suggests that 
even somewhat independent officers respect that power.  The United States 
Attorneys also acted properly, however, when they refused to prosecute 
cases, having found insufficient evidence to warrant prosecution.120  By 
doing so, they did not deny the President executive power.  For his 
executive power consists of a power to lead and cajole, not to exercise 
complete control.121 
 The Constitution does not deny the President political influence.  
Vesting him with executive power and providing for his election does make 
him a powerful political actor.  But to read the Vesting Clause so broadly as 
to deny the role of duty-bound officials or Congress in shaping executive 
branch political decisions about how to execute law simply ignores most of 
the provisions that speak directly about the relationship between the 
President and others.122  Thus, the Constitution’s text as a whole establishes 
a duty-based theory, even if the Vesting Clause in isolation might plausibly 
be read to establish the President’s complete control over the executive 
branch.   
 
C.  The Political Dimension:  Structure and Intertextual Analysis 
 The Constitution does not give any branch of government, let alone, 
a single individual, sole control over political decisions.  Instead, it sets up 
competing institutions precisely in order to instigate a process of 
                                                   
118
 Cf. Strauss, Overseer, supra note 13, at 714 (pointing out that powerful executive branch 
officials, even when formally removable by the President, cannot be removed without 
substantial political cost). 
119
 DAVID IGLESIAS & DAVIN SEAY, IN JUSTICE 86 (2008) ( explaining that David Iglesias’ 
formed a task force to review evidence of voter fraud). 
120
 See ID. at 87 (stating that Iglesias found no prosecutable cases after his extensive review 
of files). Kondracke Assumed Voter Fraud as Fact in Claiming Prosecutor Firings Were 
About “The Failure to Prosecute It,” MEDIA MATTERS AM., July 12, 2007, 
http://mediamatters.org/items/200707120008 (reporting that former prosecutor, John 
McKay, who was accused of failure to pursue voter fraud, did not convene a grand jury on 
the issue because he thought “'there was no evidence of voter fraud.'”).   
121
 See Pierce, supra note 57, at 10-11 (claiming that “jawboning” has always been the most 
important source of Presidential influence over the bureaucracy); Stack, supra note 115, at 
295-96 (distinguishing between the presidential power to influence an agency from a power 
to direct a particular outcome). 
122
 Cf. Froomkin, Note, supra note 14, at 812-13 (arguing that the “Take Care Clause” 
authorizes the President to enforce Congressional performance standards, not to “create the 
standards” himself). 
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competition to control policy, in hopes that the resulting compromises will 
reflect the People’s will.  
 No branch of government has complete control over its political 
decisions.  The primary body for political decision-making, the Congress, 
does not have complete control over legislation, for the Constitution 
empowers the President to veto legislation.123   Only in the rare case when 
public support for a particular piece of legislation produces a 2/3 
congressional majority for a vetoed bill may Congress legislate without the 
President’s assent.124  Similarly, the judiciary, while obviously enjoying a 
great deal of independence, must implement laws passed by others.  
Congress may and sometimes does override even the Supreme Court’s 
decisions interpreting statutes, by passing fresh legislation to overturn a 
judicial decision.125  While considerably more difficult, the states may 
amend the Constitution to override a judicial construction of the 
Constitution, as they did with respect to an early judicial construction of the 
11th Amendment.126  And the Congress has substantial control over the 
judiciary’s jurisdiction, for it can deny the Supreme Court authority to hear 
appeals in a category of cases and the lower courts only exist because 
Congress decided to bring them into being.127  In light of the significant 
                                                   
123
 U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 7, cl. 3.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1975) (noting that 
the veto provision makes the President “a participant in the lawmaking process”); I ANNALS, 
supra note 99, at 464 (James Madison) (characterizing the President’s veto power as a 
qualification of the grant of legislative power to Congress). 
124
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3. 
125
 See, e.g., Robert Pear, Congress Passes Civil Rights Bill, Adding Protections for the 
Disabled, N.Y. TIMES at A21, September 18, 2008 (explaining that a new disability rights 
bill overturns “several recent Supreme Court decisions”). 
126
 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 719-21 (1999) (discussing how the 11th Amendment 
overruled Chisholm v. Georgia). 
127
 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513-14 (1860) 
(suggesting that Congressional power to strip the Court of jurisdiction has few limits); 
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145-48 (1872) (prohibiting Congress from 
dictating the outcomes of cases through jurisdiction stripping).  The extent of Congressional 
jurisdiction stripping power has been the subject of extended debate.  See, e.g., Michael 
Wells, Congress’s Paramount Role in Setting the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction, 85 NW U. 
L. REV. 465 (1991); Akhil R. Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Federal Judiciary Act 
of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article 
III:  Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Gerald 
Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:  An Opinionated 
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Robert N. Clinton, A 
Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction:  A Guided Quest for the Original 
Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Paul M. Bator, Congressional 
Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1982), Lawrence 
G. Sager, The Supreme Court 1980 Term—Foreword:  Constitution Limitations on 
Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 
(1981); RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1-2, 285-90 (1969); Henry 
M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Court:  An 
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953).  Cf. Steven Calabresi and Gary 
Lawson, Essay:  The Unitary Executive, Jurisdiction Stripping, and the Hamdan Opinions:   
A Textualist Response to Justice Scalia, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1002, 1008 (2007) (arguing 
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interbranch controls over Congress and the judiciary, it would be surprising 
indeed to learn that the Constitution gave the President unilateral control 
over executive branch political decisions.   
 The analysis of the Constitution’s rejection of the patronage state 
presented above shows that the Constitution establishes a system of checks 
and balances to control executive branch political decision-making as well, 
not a system of unilateral presidential control.128  The congressional role in 
appointments, removal, and creating departments (not to mention budget) 
give it substantial leverage over political decision-making within the 
executive branch.  The requirement that executive branch officials swear an 
oath to defend the Constitution reinforces the congressional role in 
appointments in seeking to negate efforts by Presidents to turn executive 
branch officials into instruments of presidential pleasure.  Instead, the 
Constitution envisions a dialogue between a powerful President and 
somewhat independent officials about appropriate discretionary decision-
making within a rule of law framework.129    
    
D.  Pre-Enactment History 
 Professors Calabresi and Prakash, both leading unitarians, 
emphasize that Originalists find history preceding enactment of the 
Constitution more probative than post-enactment history.130  The pertinent 
pre-enactment history supports a duty-based theory and shows that the 
Framers did not envision a patronage state. 
 While issues of how to structure the executive branch generated 
heated debate and elaborate compromises, all agreed on the object of 
securing obedience to the Constitution.131  In the words of James Madison, 
the Constitution sought to make the “private interest of every individual . . . 
a sentinel over the public rights.”132 
 The pre-enactment history shows the breadth of support for a 
Constitution based on duty.133  The Convention unanimously approved of 
                                                                                                                            
that the Constitution does not authorize stripping the Court’s jurisdiction, but rather just the 
moving of jurisdiction between the appellate and original jurisdiction categories).    
128
 Accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (Madison) (describing the Constitution as arranging “the 
several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other. . .”); ANNALS, 
supra note 99, 487 (statement of Mr. Jackson) (denying that the Constitution vests executive 
power in the President alone, because of the Senate’s role in appointments and treaty 
making); Strauss, Agencies, supra note 13, at 640 (noting that “a focus on checks and 
balances” legitimizes civil servants as a “fourth force” in government). 
129
 See generally Stack, supra note 115, at 316 (discussing the value of a dialogue between 
the President and agencies for the rule of law and sound policy).   
130
 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 550-51.   
131
 Cf. ANNALS, supra note 99, at 88 (reporting Gerry’s remark that the Oath Clauses would 
assure that the Officers see themselves as part of the national government, thereby 
discouraging “a preference to the State Gov[ernments]”). 
132
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
133
 See, e.g., MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS:  A 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 7 (2nd. ed. 2000) (explaining that Morris cited 
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the idea that Oath Clauses should apply to federal officers.134  These clauses 
followed the practice of the Rump Parliament, which after abolishing the 
office of King, required public officials to swear allegiance to a republican 
constitution and to promise faithful performance of the duties pertaining to 
their particular office.135  Debate in the Constitutional Convention focused 
on the question of whether state officials must swear an oath of allegiance 
to the federal government, with the nationalists prevailing in their view that 
state officials must swear such an oath.136    
The pedigree of the Take Care Clause shows that a clause vesting 
power in a single executive in conjunction with a responsibility to oversee 
faithful execution of the law does not imply executive control over 
executive branch officials.  The Take Care Clause closely tracks the 
language found in the New York Constitution of 1777, which did have a 
single, rather than a plural executive.137  New York’s Constitution, like 
many other state constitutions, also provided a model for the Vesting 
Clause, as it stipulated that the State’s “executive power . . . shall be vested 
in a governor.”138  Yet, the combination of a Vesting Clause, a Take Care 
Clause, and a single executive in New York did not create a patronage state 
featuring executive control over executive branch appointees.  Instead, New 
York’s Constitution generally gave the appointments power to a “council of 
appointment” in which the Governor had but one vote, while authorizing the 
Assembly to select the State Treasurer.139   And the New York Constitution 
contained a general rule that offices are “held during the pleasure of the 
council on appointment,” not the chief executive.140  As Professor Corwin 
explained long ago, the New York Constitution gave the Governor “very 
little voice in either appointments or removal.”141  Thus, the most relevant 
                                                                                                                            
the General Oath Clause’s applicability to Senators as a reason to trust the Senate with the 
impeachment power).  
134
 See II FARRAND, supra note 2, at 84. 
135
 See Campbell, supra note 53, at 8. 
136
 See I FARRAND, supra note 2, at 203-04. 
137
 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 16, at 32 (describing the New York Constitution as 
“more unitary” than other state constitutions and noting the framers’ approval of its “articles 
on executive power”); BRUFF, supra note 30, at 16 (pointing out that the New York 
constitution required the Governor “to take care that the laws are executed to the best of his 
ability”); Casper, supra note 99, at 241 (describing  New York’s constitution as the state 
constitution most “generous . . . toward the executive branch”).   
138
 N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XVII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 2623, 2632  (Francis Newton Thorpe ed. 1909) [hereinafter STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS]. 
139
 ID. art. XXIII.   The Council consisted of one senator from each district and the 
Governor.  See ID. 
140
 ID., art. XXVIII.  
141
 I CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 354 (Richard Loss ed. 1981) [emphasis added].  Nor 
were these the only similarities between Article II and New York’s constitutional 
framework for executive power.  See CORWIN, supra note 38, at 7 (explaining that the New 
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state antecedent suggests that the Constitution’s ratifiers would not have 
understood the choice of a single executive model through the Vesting and 
Take Care Clauses as establishing complete executive control over 
officers.142    
 Indeed, the Framers of the federal Constitution considered and 
rejected a model of complete presidential control over executive branch 
officials.  Early on, the Framers supported a proposal that allowed the 
President alone to appoint executive officers “not otherwise provided 
for.”143   On June 15, 1787, Hamilton suggested that the President alone 
should appoint the heads of the departments of Finance, War, and Foreign 
Affairs.144  The Framers, however, ultimately created a Senatorial role in 
selection of high officeholders to appease a number of delegates to the 
constitutional convention who believed that “granting the appointment 
power to the executive would lead to monarchy.”145  The Senate power 
would serve as a safeguard against “incautious or corrupt” presidential 
nominations.146  At the same time, the Framers rejected proposals to allow 
the legislature sole control over appointments, a model found in many state 
constitutions.147  The requirement that only candidates securing the approval 
of both the President and the Senate assume high office increases the 
likelihood that only those likely to take their duties to properly implement 
the law seriously would assume office. 
 In addition, members of the Convention proposed that major cabinet 
officers “be appointed by the President during pleasure,” which would mean 
that the President could remove them at will.148  And a report of the 
Committee on Details reflects a proposal to empower the President to 
“suspend Officers, civil and military.”149  The Constitution eventually 
proposed and ratified, however, reflected the rejection of these proposals to 
empower the President to remove or suspend officers. 
 The records of the Federal Convention suggest that the proponents 
of executive power gave away complete presidential control over appointees 
                                                                                                                            
York governor was elected, bore the title of Commander-in-Chief, and possessed a power to 
pardon); THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Hamilton) 
142
 See CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, I THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 471-72 (1906) 
(describing  John Jay, Robert Livingston, and Governor Morris as exercising a “controlling 
influence” in preparing the New York State Constitution through their membership on the 
drafting committee). 
143
 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 
1781 47 (W.W. Norton 1987); I FARRAND, supra note 2, at 67; GERHARDT, supra note 94, at 
19 (explaining that this proposal was generally intended to give the executive sole control 
over appointments). 
144
 GERHARDT, supra note 93, at 19.   Even this proposal, however, contemplated a Senate 
role in other appointments.  See ID. 
145
 ID. at 17. 
146
 ID. at 23. 
147
 See Strauss, Agencies, supra note 13, at 599. 
148
 II FARRAND, supra note 2, at 335-36, 342-43 (proposing presidential appointment at 
pleasure for secretaries of domestic affairs, commerce, foreign affairs, war, marine, and 
state”) 
149
 See ID. at 158. 
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in exchange for abandonment of a true plural executive model, with a 
committee playing a key mandatory role in determining executive actions.  
The rejected provisions making heads of departments removable at will 
formed part of a proposal to have an executive council advising the 
President.150  Proponents of a plural executive probably offered this 
presidential control over appointment and removal in a bid to secure 
adoption of this modest form of a plural executive, having failed to 
convince the majority to allow for a committee at the head of the executive 
branch.151  The debates reveal that the Framers viewed a congressional 
check on appointments or an executive council as two ways of addressing 
the fears of monarchy that a number of Framers expressed and that could 
lead the people to reject the Constitution.152  The Constitution adopted at the 
Convention (and ultimately ratified by the people) reflects a compromise in 
which the advocates of presidential power defeated the plural executive 
proposals, but gave up control over executive branch appointments and 
removal as part of the bargain.153 
 The decision in favor of a single executive did not establish 
complete presidential power over other executive branch officials.  The 
Framers considered the question of whether they should propose a single 
executive model to the People as separate from the question of what power 
the executive would yield and how it would be checked.154  Indeed, 
Alexander Hamilton, in an effort to bring some order to an unruly debate 
over his unitary executive proposal, suggested that the Convention “fix the 
extent of the Executive authority” before deciding between “a unity and a 
plurality in the Executive,”155 an indication that he viewed the questions of 
plurality versus singularity and the general nature of executive authority as 
separate matters.156 
Furthermore, the arguments that ultimately persuaded the Framers to 
choose a single President have little to do with the question of whether an 
official other than the President might yield authority unchecked by him.  
                                                   
150
  ID. at 335-342. 
151
  See II ID. at 538-39, 542 (reflecting James Wilson’s preference for a council over a 
Senate role in appointments). 
152
 See, e.g., I ID., at 66 (referring to the unitary executive as the “foetus of monarch”). 
153
 See ID. at 66, 71-74, 88, 91-92; 2 ID. at 335-37, 533, 537, 542.  See also Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129-131 (1975) (describing the provisions providing for shared 
presidential and Senatorial appointment as a compromise arrived at after considering 
provisions giving the President sole control over some appointments and the Senate sole 
control over others). 
154
 See I FARRAND supra note 2, at 96 (distinguishing questions of the degree of executive 
power from the question of whether to have “co-ordinate heads” of the Executive 
department); see also id. at 63 (showing assignment of executive power and appointment 
power to an “executive” after postponement of a proposal to specify that the executive is 
unitary). 
155
 See ID. at 69. 
156
 Cf. Strauss, Agencies, supra note 13, at 600 (acknowledging a decision to create a 
politically accountable unitary executive, but finding the Constitution “ambivalent” about 
the nature of the President’s relationships with those actually administering the laws).   
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They expressed concerned about the prospect of a committee running an 
executive branch failing to agree upon a question, especially in the context 
of war.157  The advocates of a vigorous executive convinced their opponents 
that this paralysis possibility should lead them to accept a single President 
that would not be required to consult an executive council.  Rejection of a 
committee, however, does not signal a clear decision rejecting giving 
authority to single independent officers of the government.158      
 Duty’s centrality becomes even more apparent when one considers 
the important role the Framers envisioned for State execution of federal law.  
During the debate over the Constitution’s ratification many expressed 
anxiety over federal officials enforcing laws within the states, especially in 
the context of collecting tax revenue.159  If the Framers envisioned a unitary 
state, one would have expected them to have responded with assurances that 
the President would control and reign in abusive federal tax collectors.  
That, however, was not the response.  Instead, the Constitution’s proponents 
assured the fearful that state officials would collect federal taxes and 
enforce other federal laws.160 
                                                   
157
 See, I FARRAND, supra note 2, at 96-97 (showing that a resolution favoring a unitary 
executive passed just after James Wilson and Gerry had raised the nonagreement problem, 
with Gerry opining that this problem would “extremely inconvenient in many instances, 
particularly in military matters.”), 105 (citing the prospect of “anarchy and confusion” from 
non-agreement of a plural executive just before a motion affirming the unitary choice 
carried); see also Strauss, Agencies,  supra note 13, at 600 (characterizing the choice of a 
single executive as a rejection of large “executive body”).  
158
 See II FARRAND, supra note 2, at 158 (proposing to “vest” the executive authority in the 
President but then imposing a duty to “attend to” the execution of the laws, rather than to 
actually carry them out); PHELPS, supra note 2, at 143 (discussing Congressional 
abandonment during the Revolutionary War of “plural executives” – government by 
committee – in favor of “individual secretaries for war, marine, foreign affairs, and 
finance”) (emphasis added).  George Washington personally believed in a strong unitary 
executive model, where the President would have complete control over the executive 
branch of government, including appointments.  Id. at 142-149.  But the Constitutional 
Convention rejected that model when it allowed the Senate a role in approving appointments 
and provided for impeachment.   
159
 See Prakash, supra note 71, at 1996-97, 2002-03 (discussing “those who feared the 
specter of a large federal bureaucracy” often in the context of discussions of tax collection). 
160
 Id. at 2003-2004 (explaining that both Federalists and Anti-Federalists “understood that 
state officials” would enforce federal law); THE FEDERALIST NOS. 44, 45 (James Madison), 
supra note 66, at 312, 328 (respecting tax collection and state officers’ “essential agency in 
giving effect to the . . . Constitution”); NOS. 27, 36 (Alexander Hamilton), supra at 221, 261 
(stating that the government would employ each state’s “ordinary magistracy” in “the 
execution of” federal law and would give effect to the Constitution);  NO. 29 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (explaining that in instances of disobedience and disorder state militiamen would 
serve under federal command); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; Stephen I. Vladeck, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1091, 1098 (2008); William C. Banks, Providing Supplemental Security -- 
The Insurrection Act and the Military Role in Responding to Domestic Crises, 5 J. NAT’L 
SEC. L. & POL’Y __, ___ (2009) (forthcoming) (pointing out that the debate over ratification 
focused on whether the state militia would be called out, with no room for the use of federal 
troops in the case of insurrection); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative 
Law:  Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L. J. 1256, 1343 (2006) (pointing out 
that use of state enforcers was viewed during the Federalist period “as a means of 
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 The President, of course, would have no authority to appoint or 
remove these officials.161  The Constitution does, however, contain a duty-
based means of checking abusive state officials.162  For the Constitution 
requires not just federal officials, but also state officials, to swear to support 
the Constitution under the General Oath Clause.163  And the argument made 
above that this duty should make oath swearers responsive to legitimate 
presidential requests seeking to reign in abuse, while obligating them to 
resist illegal presidential directives, applies to state officials.  The notion of 
a large federal bureaucracy under presidential control is a modern invention 
not within the contemplation of the Framers.164   
 As the ratification debate proceeded, Alexander Hamilton 
recognized that the Constitution adopted, in spite of his best efforts, did not 
provide for the patronage state, but instead embraced the concept of duty 
and fidelity to law.  Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers that with 
respect to appointments, the Constitution subjects the President “to the 
control of a branch of the legislative body,” because of fears of “abuse of 
executive authority” respecting appointment.165  Hamilton explains, again in 
the Federalist papers, that the Senate role in appointments prevents 
appointees too easily controlled by the President from assuming office.  He 
describes the Senate advice and consent role as discouraging the President 
from nominating candidates “personally allied to him, or . . . possessing the 
necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious 
instruments of his pleasure.”166  This anti-quisling statement supports the 
implication already drawn from the General Oath Clause, that the founders 
intended executive officers to have some degree of independence from the 
President, at least sufficient to make them a force for the rule of law.  Thus, 
he justified the Senate’s role in appointments as a measure designed to 
discourage nomination of people that the President could completely 
control.167   
                                                                                                                            
restraining” the federal government’s power); MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF 
GOVERNMENT, 101-28 (2003).  The Constitution explicitly provides for presidential control 
over the state militias, but nowhere provides him with authority to direct state officials 
executing federal law absent an insurrection or rebellion necessitating a calling of a state 
militia into service.  See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (making the President “commander-
in-chief” of state militias when they are pressed into federal service).  
161
 See Prakash, supra note 71, at 2000 (pointing out that Hamilton and Madison recognized 
that “the federal government would have no direct influence on the selection of state 
officials”). 
162
 See id. at 2001 (explaining that state officials have a duty to enforce federal law). 
163
 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
164
 See Ackerman, supra note 9, at 691 (pointing out that the Founders did not “have the 
slightest idea” that the federal government’s civilian workforce would grow from the 2597 
officials of 1802 to the 1,872,000 in 1997); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the 
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1233-37 (1994) (discussing the federal 
bureaucracy’s growth over time). 
165
 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 66, at 464.  
166
 ID. NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton), at 458. 
167
 ID.   
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Hamilton’s comments on removal likewise acknowledge the 
Constitution’s rejection of the patronage state.  In the Federalist Number 77 
he explains that the requirement of Senate approval of appointments 
contributes to “stability of the administration.”168  This stability arises, 
Hamilton explains, because the Senate’s approval would be required in 
order to remove an executive officer.169  Thus, Hamilton assumed that the 
President would lack the power to unilaterally remove an executive officer; 
rather he could only do so with the Senate’s assent.  This may reflect a 
belief that impeachment constitutes the exclusive procedure for removing 
executive branch officials, or it may instead assume that any additional 
procedures must conform to the principle that officeholders retain their 
positions “on the pleasure of those who appoint them.”170  His explanation 
of how the Senate’s role in removal contributes to stability wholly rejects 
the patronage state and embraces a duty-based model: 
 
A change to the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so 
violent or so general a revolution in the officers of governments 
might be expected if he were the sole disposer of offices.  Where a 
man in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for 
it, a new president would be restrained from attempting a change in 
favor of a person more agreeable to him by the apprehension that a 
discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring 
some discredit upon himself.171 
 
This passage clearly treats the lack of presidential control of removal as a 
virtue.  Hamilton finds the Senate role salutary because it discourages 
replacement of fit officers with people “more agreeable” to the President.   
This rejection of presidential political control through appointment 
of “agreeable” officers strongly suggests endorsement of a model of 
government based on expertise and duty and a rejection of the unitary 
executive theory’s political dimension.  The references to the President as 
merely the “Chief Magistrate,” a modest locution found throughout the 
Federalist Papers, reinforces the impression that the Constitution that 
Hamilton here defended seeks a stable rule of law, not the rule of 
presidential personality based on a particular set of personal policy 
preferences.172   
                                                   
168
 ID. NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton), at 459.  
169
 ID.  (stating that “The consent of [the Senate] . . . would be necessary to displace as well 
as to appoint.”)   
170
 ID. NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton), at 404 (claiming that all state governments follow the 
practice of “rendering those who hold office during pleasure dependent on those who 
appoint them.”) 
171
 ID. NO. 77, at 459. 
172
 See ID. NOS. 3  4, 18, 39, 47, 48, 66, 68-77; Prakash, supra note 71, at 2034 (characterizing 
the magistracy as “servants of the laws of the land,” rather than as sovereign).  Prakash 
insists that the magistracy cannot “pick and choose” which laws to enforce.  Id.  While he 
makes these remarks in the context of explaining why state judges and executive officers 
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The intertemporal stability that Hamilton champions constitutes a 
well established element of the very idea of a “rule of law” that the 
Constitution’s drafters passed down to us.  The “rule of law” implies that 
election of a new President will not radically change the laws’ meaning, 
absent a congressional decision to amend it.173  The Constitution locates the 
political power to alter policy, not in unilateral presidential preferences, but 
in the legislative process, which the President participates in, but does not 
control.174     
The Founders shared a vision of a government not dominated by 
politics and faction, but rather by a public-regarding sense of duty, what 
historian Gordon Wood has referred to as a “vision of disinterested 
leadership.”175  The notion that the President would have a policy of his own 
different from that of Congress simply played no part in the Republican 
ideology of the Founders.176  Indeed, at the founding the constitutional 
vision of congressional dominance in policy was so strong that it led George 
Washington to refrain from vetoing domestic measures he disagreed with on 
policy grounds and from proposing specific legislation.177  The notion that 
the political preference of a sitting President, as opposed to the policy 
decisions embodied in statutes that the President has not vetoed, would 
govern administration of domestic law appears wholly foreign to the 
Framers.178 
 Hamilton’s comments not only reflect a key Framer’s intent, they 
also give us some of the best clues we have about what the people who 
adopted the Constitution thought it meant.  For these statements appeared in 
newspaper articles intended to influence the debate over the Constitution’s 
                                                                                                                            
must enforce federal law under the Constitution, see  id., the Federalist Papers clearly 
include the President as part of the magistracy, albeit as the Chief Magistrate.   
173
 See William N. Eskridge Jr., & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Supreme 
Court Treatment of Agency Deference from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L. J. 1083, 1170 
(2008) (describing “vertical predictability” — the consistency of law over time—as an 
element of the rule of law). 
174
 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 48, 51 (J. Madison) (discussing the legislature’s superiority 
and stating that “[i]n republican government, . . . legislative authority . . . predominates” 
respectively); see also Katyal, supra note 8, at 2317 (noting the Framers’ assumption that 
“massive changes to the status quo required legislative enactments not executive decrees.”). 
175
 WOOD, supra note 6, at 165. 
176
 See PHELPS, supra note 2, at 81 (stating that “the idea that there could be equally valid, 
but different notions of the public interest” appeared nonsensical to George Washington, 
because he believed in a single “public interest to which virtuous men could unanimously 
subscribe”)    
177
 ID. at 139-42, 150-54 (describing Washington’s approach to vetoes and legislative 
proposals).  George Washington generally vetoed domestic legislation only on constitutional 
grounds and let domestic measures he disagreed with pass.  ID. at 150-54.  But he did veto 
measures implicating his foreign affairs power on policy grounds.  ID. at 153-154.   
178
 See II FARRAND, supra note 2, at 109 (reporting Madison’s description of the Executive’s 
powers as “limited”); cf. Strauss, Agencies, supra note 13, at 642 (arguing that the need for 
priority setting and coordination justifies presidential retention of “substantial lines of 
communication and guidance.”). 
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ratification.179  Since the Constitution owes its authority, not to its drafters, 
but to the People who chose to adopt it, Framers’ public remarks aimed at 
securing the Constitution’s adoption merit special weight.180 
The Framers rejected Hamilton’s effort to create a pure type of 
unitary executive reflecting a system of complete presidential control.181  
The Constitution reflects a compromise between those seeking an unfettered 
executive following a rather pure model of separated powers and those 
fearful of replicating monarchy, who sought congressional control of the 
executive branch.182  Both the proponents of executive independence and 
vigor and those who sought legislative control and government by 
committee, however, aimed to secure a government animated by a sense of 
duty and fidelity to the law. 
 
E.  Duty in the Early Republic 
 The debates and actions of the early Republic provide some 
evidence of the Framers’ intent, since so many of them remained active in 
government after the Constitution passed.183  The First Congress’ actions in 
organizing the execution of the laws show reflect a consensus favoring the 
duty-based theory and division on questions of presidential power.   
 The first statute the new Congress passed implemented the Oath 
Clause that applies to lower level executive branch officials and others.184  
Unlike the Presidential Oath Clause, the General Oath Clause did not set 
                                                   
179
 See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers, 87 B.U.L.REV. 801, 
812-17 (2007) (discussing the early publication history of these papers). 
180
 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 551 (describing originalism as based on “the 
text of the Constitution, as originally understood by the people who ratified it”) (emphasis 
added); Powell, supra note 15, at 936-39 (explaining that Madison and other federalists 
argued that the intentions of the ratifiers, not the drafters, should guide constitutional 
interpretation); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-04 (1819) (pointing 
out that the constitution “derives its whole authority” from state ratifying conventions, since 
“the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject” the “mere proposal” the Framers 
made); GERHARDT, supra note 133, at 3 (stating that the “convention delegates themselves 
recognized that their views on the” Constitution’s meaning “mattered less than the opinions 
of the ratifiers”). Cf. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 612 (suggesting that Hamilton’s 
remarks in The Federalist have little probative value, because they seek to placate the anti-
Federalists).   
181
 See, e.g. II FARRAND, supra note 2, at 64-69 (showing that advocates of a unitary 
executive sought to defeat the proposal to make the President impeachable); 538 (recounting 
objections to the Senate’s role in appointments as “blending” legislative and executive 
power). 
182
 See, e.g., ID. at 639 (describing the power of the Senate over appointments and thus over 
the executive branch as a substitute for the rejected constitutional council); see generally  
Mashaw, supra note 160, at 1272 (describing Hamilton’s defense of Article II in the 
Federalist Papers as an effort to assure doubters that the President would have modest power 
compared to the King of England).  
183
 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1986) (explaining that the first Congress’ 
acts constitute “weighty evidence” of the Constitution’s meaning, because “many” of its 
members helped frame the Constitution).   
184
 WATSON, supra note 69, at 1334. 
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forth the required oath’s language. The new Congress, before taking up the 
matter of structuring executive departments, passed a law setting out the 
oath’s language.185  
 Society took oaths seriously at the time.186  The customs of the age 
required a gentleman accused of violating an oath to seek satisfaction from 
the accuser, sometimes in the form of a duel.187  The early Congresses added 
to this seriousness by passing statutes specifying penalties for oath 
violations or failure to take oaths.188  They also frequently required 
officeholders to post bonds, which they would forfeit if they failed to 
perform certain duties properly.189  The early Republic employed oaths and 
other mechanisms to seek to assure that those executing federal power 
conformed to the law.   
 Consistent with the promises made during the Ratification debates, 
the early Republic relied heavily upon state officials to collect taxes and 
carry out other federal executive functions.  The President did not 
participate in these officials’ appointment to their offices and had no 
authority to remove them from those offices.190  He did indeed exercise 
influence over them, exhorting them to properly enforce both the federal tax 
on liquors and later the Neutrality Laws, the latter in the face of 
considerable local opposition in some regions.191  Having sworn an oath to 
support the Constitution, they generally cooperated with the federal 
government in enforcing federal laws, in spite of the President’s inability to 
influence their appointment or removal.192  In 1791, Congress also delegated 
significant authority to a semi-private corporation, the First National Bank, 
over which the President exercised precious little authority.193 
 The First Congress did not consistently favor executive control over 
the federal bureaucracy either.  In statutes establishing the Departments of 
War, the Navy, and Foreign Affairs, Congress directed these departments’ 
                                                   
185
 An Act to Regulate the Time and Manner of Administering Certain Oaths, 1 Stat. 23 
(1789). 
186
 Mashaw, supra note 160, at 1309 n. 167 (describing oaths as “serious business”). 
187
 Id.; JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR:  NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 
159-98 (2001). 
188
 An Act To Regulate the Collection of Duties on Imports and Tonnage, ch. 22 § 20, 1 
Stat. 627, 641-42 (1799); An Act Repealing, After the Last Day of June Next, the Duties 
Heretofore Laid Upon Distilled Spirits Imported from Abroad, and Laying Others in Their 
Stead; and also upon Spirits Distilled within the United States, and for Appropriating the 
Same, ch. 15 § 6, 1 Stat. 199, 200 (1791); An Act Making Provision for the Debt of the 
United States, ch. 34, § 11, 1 Stat. 138, 142 (1790). 
189
 See Mashaw, supra note 160, at 1317-18 (providing examples). 
190
  See Prakash, supra note 71, at 2000 (pointing out that the President exercised no control 
over state officers’ appointment). 
191
 See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 12, at 640-41.  
192
 Id. & n. 442 (discussing governors’ willingness to enforce neutrality at George 
Washington’s request). 
193
 An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 
191 (1791); see Mashaw, supra note, 160, at 296 (describing the Bank as more independent 
of presidential direction than today’s Federal Reserve).    
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heads to follow the President’s directions.194  By contrast, Congress 
afforded the Secretary of the Treasury and the Postmaster General a 
measure of independence from the President.195   
The President also lodged significant specific authorities in both the heads 
of the Treasury Department and Post Officers and other officials in these 
departments under the Necessary and Proper Clause.196 
 The First Congress confronted the issue of whether the President 
should be able to remove officers from government when it established the 
federal executive departments.  The 1789 debate on this subject in Congress 
suggests that after ratification members of the founding generation no 
longer shared a common understanding of the Constitution’s meaning with 
respect to removal or had decided to continue to pursue their disparate 
views of wise policy.197  In the House debate, which we have a record of, 
some opined that impeachment was the only permissible means of removal; 
others insisted that the Senate must concur in removal decisions not 
involving crimes; others thought that the President must have removal 
authority; and still others believed that the Constitution permitted Congress 
to craft removal provisions as it saw fit without significant restraints.198  The 
lack of consensus about the Constitution’s meaning in this debate shows 
that the unitary Framers’ intent favoring a Senatorial role in removal that 
existed prior to ratification, vanished immediately thereafter.199  
 The House of Representatives eventually passed an enigmatic bill 
on removal.  It rejected language that would have unequivocally given the 
President the authority to remove executive officers.  Instead, the House 
adopted bills that stated who should retain custody of papers whenever the 
                                                   
194
 See Act of Apr. 30, 1789, ch. 35 §, 1 Stat. 553, 553 (imposing a duty on the Secretary of 
the Navy to “execute such orders as he shall receive from the President”); Act of Aug. 7, 
1789, ch. 7, §, 1 Stat. 49, 50 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (2000)) (directing the 
Secretary of War to conduct the department’s business according to the President’s 
instructions); Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 4, §, 1 Stat. 28, 28-29 (codified as amended at 22 
U.S.C. § 2651 (2000)) (directing the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to perform duties 
“entrusted to him by the President” according to presidential instructions). 
195
 See Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, §, 1 Stat. 65, 65-66 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 31 U.S.C. (2000)); Act of May 8, 1794, ch. 23, § 3, 1 Stat. 354, 357; Charles 
Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks as Abuses of Executive 
Power, 63 B.U.L. REV. 59, 74 (1983) (explaining how Congress made the Comptroller 
General independent  of presidential direction).   
196
 See Mashaw, supra note 160, at 1284-1289 (describing these duties and the complex mix 
of independence, Congressional direction, and presidential control employed in the 
enactments establishing these departments and their duties). 
197
 See Casper, supra note 99, at 237 (identifying the “multitude of views expressed” about 
separation of powers as the most significant aspect of the House debate).   
198
 See id. at 234-35 (summarizing the various positions). 
199
 See I CORWIN, supra note 141, at 331-32 (claiming that only a small minority on the 
House found that the President’s power under Article II entitled him to have sole removal 
authority); cf. Froomkin Note, supra note 14, at 795 n. 37 (criticizing Justice Taft’s 
reasoning in Myers v. United States as exaggerating the “degree of unanimity” in the 
decision of 1789). 
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President removes the head of a department, by narrow margins.200  The 
Senate at first refused to consent to including this language in the Treasury 
Department Bill.201  Eventually though, the Decision of 1789 – the decision 
to include this language in the bills creating the Treasury, War, and Foreign 
Affairs Departments- passed, because Vice President John Adams broke 10-
10 ties on the removal issue in the Senate.202     
 While the closeness of these votes and the disparate position taken 
in debate do not establish a post-ratification consensus on the proper 
constitutional removal theory, the House debates (there is no reliable record 
of the Senate debates) strongly suggest that the political dimension of the 
unitary executive theory enjoyed no support in the founding generation.  
Those who read the Constitution as requiring presidential removal authority 
argued that presidential removal authority encouraged presidential 
responsibility and made it more likely that official abuse would be checked.  
But they did not suggest that presidential policy should control executive 
branch administration of the law.203  Even those who found that the Vesting 
Clause implied a presidential removal authority argued for it within a duty-
based framework uninfluenced by modern notions about broad presidential 
policy discretion.204   
                                                   
200
 See An Act for Establishing an Executive Department, to be Denominated the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, ch. 4, § 2, 1 Stat. 28, 29 (1789) (giving the Chief Clerk 
custody of foreign papers if the President removes the Secretary of Foreign Affairs); An Act 
to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, § 7, 1 Stat. 65, 67 (1789) (giving the Assistant 
Treasury Secretary custody of papers if the President removes the Treasury Secretary); An 
Act to Establish an Executive Department, to be Denominated the Department of War, ch. 7, 
§ 2, 1 Stat. 49, 50 (1789) (giving an inferior officer custody of papers whenever the 
President removes the Secretary of War).   Professor Prakash claims that this language 
indicates a belief that the Constitution granted the President a removal authority, so that 
Congressional delegation of such an authority was either unnecessary or inappropriate.  See 
Prakash, supra note 48, at 1026.  Most scholars who have seriously considered the issue, 
however, disagree, arguing that the bill does not reflect majority support for the notion of a 
constitutional power of removal.  1 CORWIN, supra note 141, at 332; DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS:  THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 41 n. 240 (1997); 
Curtis S. Bradley, & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 662-63 (2004).  In any case, the closeness of the vote and the 
disparity of opinions expressed in the House show that no consensus existed among the 
participants in this debate.  Accord Bradley & Flaherty, supra, at 658 (finding no consensus, 
or even majority support, for the thesis that the Vesting Clause implied that the Constitution 
requires the President to have a removal authority). 
201
 Prakash, supra note 48, at 1033 (explaining that the Senate deleted the entire section 
containing the removal language in the Treasury bill). 
202
 See id. at 1032-33 (discussing the Senate’s treatment of the bills on Foreign Affairs and 
the Treasury). 
203
 Cf. Strauss, Agencies,  supra note 13, at 604 (arguing, from a much later perspective, that 
execution of the law carries with it a “a policy function” within statutorily defined bounds) 
[emphasis supplied]. 
204
 See, e.g., 1 ANNALS, supra note 99, at 379, 387 (describing the President’s responsibility 
as that of superintending executive officers to ensure “good behavior”); see also L. WHITE, 
THE FEDERALISTS 287-88 (1965) (noting that President Adams removed officers for 
administrative neglect and delinquency).  Accord 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 625-26 (1823) 
2/20/09 Draft            DUTY-BASED EXECUTIVE POWER                                            36   
 
F.  Function 
A duty-based theory better serves the rule of law than the unitary 
executive theory.  It invites those interpreting the Constitution in the present 
day to continue the Framers’ project of trying to arrange power to produce a 
rule of law, respecting the specific decisions already made in the 
Constitution, but using the Framers’ rule of law goal as the primary guide to 
filling in the blanks.205  The unitary executive theory, by contrast, seems to 
depart from the Framers’ vision of apolitical administration by viewing 
executive power as almost an end in and of itself.206 
 The danger of the President unraveling the rule of law that the early 
proponents of checks on executive authority recognized has become more 
acute with the passage of time.  The President, for better or worse, has 
become a powerful political actor with influence far exceeding that which 
the Framers envisioned.207  This growth in presidential power flows in part 
from the expansion of the federal government’s functions, which 
accompanied the United States’ growth and rise to power.208  The increasing 
complexity and greater scope of the problems confronting the United States 
has led Congress to delegate substantial powers to the executive branch of 
government to address these problems, thereby contributing to the growth of 
the modern presidency.209  The executive branch often interprets the vast 
body of law it administers unilaterally.  In some areas, courts have no 
opportunity to review its decisions.210  Even when reviewable, the courts 
usually approach executive branch decisions deferentially and often correct 
                                                                                                                            
(describing the President’s duty as ensuring honest execution of the law, not perfectly 
correct judgment). 
205
 Cf. Ackerman, supra note 9, at 636-642 (proposing to advance critical thinking about the 
merits of competing arrangements of power). 
206
 See SAVAGE, supra note 10, at 335-36 (discussing David Addington’s statement that 
“We’re going to push and push” with respect to expanding Presidential power, “until some 
larger force makes us stop.”). 
207
 Cf. Ackerman, supra note 9, at 641 (claiming that the United States has an “excessively 
politicized style of bureaucratic government.”).  
208
 See William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands 
and Why it Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 506 (2008) (claiming that presidential power has 
been expanding since the Founding); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 
YALE L. J. 1725, 1816-17 (1996); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of 
Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994) (stating that the expansion of 
presidential power implies that his power, rather than that of the legislative branch, needs 
checking); SAVAGE, supra note 10, at 14-37 (contrasting the Framers’ modest conception of 
the presidency with subsequent growth in the office’s power). 
209
 See Katyal, supra note 8, at 2320 (tracing the growth of presidential power largely 
unchecked by Congress to the nondelegation doctrine’s collapse in the 1930’s and the 
Supreme Court invalidation of the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha); Cynthia Farina, The 
Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
987, 1022 (1997) (chiding the Supreme Court for forgetting “the contemporary reality” that 
Congress has delegated much of its lawmaking power to the executive branch). 
210
 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 32 (explaining that the executive branch usually 
decides legal issues related to war and intelligence for itself, because such issues rarely 
reach a court). 
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errors in ways that leave continuing latitude for executive branch shaping of 
the law.211  Because of the awkwardness of impeachment and funding 
cutoffs, congressional oversight provides only a very limited remedy for 
executive excess, and executive decisions to withhold information can 
further weaken oversight’s effectiveness.212 Because modern Presidents are 
so profoundly political, a danger exists that they will interpret the law 
opportunistically, to increase their own power and advance their faction’s 
political agenda, rather than faithfully execute the laws Congress has 
publicly passed.213  The opportunities for abuse have recently multiplied, 
because of the specter of terrorism, which tends to drive the executive 
toward secret policy-making of his own largely unrestrained by law.214 
 A duty-based approach calls on the President and other officials to 
resist the temptation to employ unilateral policy-making as a substitute for a 
rule of law.  It empowers prosecutors, for example, to resist demands for 
prosecution based on broadly determined political priorities, when fine-
grained analysis, which lower level officials are especially well suited to 
provide, indicates a lack of evidence of sufficiently serious offenses to 
justify prosecution.  Often those with specialized knowledge of the law and 
technical issues related to it can execute the law more faithfully than a 
President who has his own political agenda, and a very broad one at that.215  
The specialists are more likely to have the time to fully investigate what the 
law means and to appreciate its specific ramifications, even though 
presidential leadership can play a role in shaping discretionary decisions and 
in discouraging specialists’ myopia.216  But that leadership is most likely to 
serve rather than subvert the rule of law when the President recognizes a 
                                                   
211
 See David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing:  The Paradox of Demanding Concrete 
Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808, 858-59 (2004) (explaining 
that remands often do not specify cases’ final outcomes). 
212
 Johnsen, supra note 8, at 1562-63 (explaining the limitations on Congressional oversight, 
impeachment, funding, and justiciability); Froomkin Note, supra note 14, at 797-98 
(explaining that Congressional threats to cut off funding “on any project of political 
significance” lack credibility). 
213
 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 33 (discussing the danger of the executive branch 
“interpreting the law opportunistically to serve its own ends.”); Ackerman, supra note 9, at 
712 (explaining that Presidents tend to “politicize the bureaucracy” in order to carry out 
their programs, especially when the President cannot obtain his goals through legislation ). 
214
 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 183 (explaining that the President’s control over the 
military and intelligence agencies, his ability to act in secret, and his power to self- interpret 
legal limits on his authority create extraordinary opportunities for abuse); see also Katyal, 
supra note 8, at 2343-45 (discussing the need to check the modern executive, which 
conducts its business in secret and possess far more power and resources than the Framers 
anticipated).  Cf. Ackerman, supra note 9, at 645-46 (noting that constitutions in Latin 
America emulating the American presidentialist model have all led, at one time or another, 
to dictatorship). 
215
 See generally Ackerman, supra note 9, at 689 (stating that “unfettered political 
intervention” has “predictably toxic effects on the rule of law.”) 
216
 See Strauss, Agencies, supra note 13, at 586 (describing civil servants as knowing the 
statutes they administer in detail and often holding “strong views of the public good in the 
field in which they work.”) Eskridge & Baer, supra note 173, at 1174-75 (discussing an 
agency tendency toward “tunnel vision”). 
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duty to remain faithful to policy decisions made by others, such as the 
Congress, and when executive branch officials remain able to fulfill their 
oath of office without having to abandon their posts.  This duty-based 
approach creates the conditions for a dialogue about how to exercise 
discretionary authority properly, to make wise decisions with the constraints 
of law. 
IV.  THE DUTY-BASED THEORY’S IMPLICATIONS 
This part explores the duty-based theory’s implications for current 
law and practice.  It elucidates some general implications, discusses its 
ramifications for current law governing removal and appointment of 
executive branch officials, and closes with a discussion of independent 
agencies.  This analysis does not exhaust the duty-based theory’s 
consequences, but illustrates how it should influence current debates.  
 
A.  General Implications 
The duty-based theory has important implications for Constitutional 
law, but cannot settle all issues of separation of powers by itself.   It can 
support deference to political branches’ joint decisions about arrangements 
of power or inform judicial decision-making when courts intervene to 
review the political branches’ structural decisions.   
The argument for more deference to political decision-makers flows 
from an appreciation of the difficulties involved in identifying institutional 
arrangements that conform to the Ratifiers’ and Framers’ desire to foster 
duty and the rule of law.  These difficulties lie at the heart of the Framers’ 
decision to enact a political compromise between proponents of strong 
presidential power as an aid in fostering “responsibility” and those who 
feared it as a means of escaping, rather than aiding, the rule of law.  
Presidents who respect the rule of law may use their power to check abuses 
of the duty to obey the law.  Presidents who prize their own independence 
and wish to make policy by themselves may laws uncongenial to them.  It is 
entirely appropriate for Congress to approve legislation embodying its own 
political judgments, within the bounds of express Constitutional constraints, 
about which institutional arrangements best advance the rule of law with the 
pattern of executive branch conduct observed.217  And if the President 
strongly disagrees with a particular congressional judgment of this kind, he 
can veto the legislation embodying that judgment, which will then only be 
sustained if sufficient popular support exists to override the veto.218  From 
this perspective, the Court’s decision in Morrison v. Olson may have been 
wise.  The Congress is in a better position than a court to evaluate the 
                                                   
217
 Accord Strauss, Agencies, supra note 13, at 604 (arguing that the Constitution envisions 
shifts in the relative strength of the President and Congress over time). 
218
 Cf. WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER-RAVEN HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE 
POWER OF THE PURSE 160 (1994) (pointing out that vetoes are so difficult to override that a 
threatened veto usually suffices to force a “change in the shape of a bill”).   
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question of whether the advantages of an independent counsel outweigh the 
risks of abuse that such a position entails.  During an era when a President 
seems willing to fire Justice Department officials not willing to do his 
bidding, such an institution may prove salutary.  But if evidence of 
prosecutorial abuse surfaces, as arguably has occurred, the Congress can 
adjust by reverting to more orthodox procedures, as it did when it allowed 
the authorization for an independent counsel to lapse.219  The Congress and 
the President, on this model, continue the Framers’ work of trying to craft 
arrangements that foster a duty to obey the law, within express 
Constitutional constraints.   
The duty-based approach can also aid courts in deciding separation 
of powers questions, even when they do not defer to legislative judgment.  
Such an approach, while not necessarily dictating any particular result in 
Morrison, could have improved the Court’s reasoning.  Justice Scalia rightly 
pointed out that the Ethics in Government Act made the independent 
counsel free of presidential control, for this was the statute’s primary 
purpose.220  The Court could have justified its decision better by recognizing 
that the Framers sought to foster a duty to properly execute the law, and that 
doing this is especially difficult when high ranking government officials 
become potential objects of law enforcement.221  In this context, 
interference with presidential control over executive branch officials may be 
appropriate, as presidential control may not serve rule of law values.222  The 
Court should have inquired into whether the removal provisions provided 
adequate checks to prevent abuses, for presidential power is but a means, 
                                                   
219
 See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (2000). 
220
 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia J., dissenting). 
221
 See BRUFF, supra note 30, at 437 (arguing that a true dilemma underlies the independent 
counsel provisions, since “powerful personal and political loyalties” can lead to under-
prosecution of executive branch officials). 
222
 See S. Rep. No. 95-170, 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.A.A.N. 4216, 4217 (stating that the 
purpose of the Ethics in Government Act is “to preserve and promote the accountability and 
integrity of public officials.”). The majority did not rely on deference to Congressional 
views to justify the Court’s opinion.  See Morrison, 487 U.S., at 670-73 (discussing the 
appointments clause issue with no reference to the values underlying the clause). Justice 
Scalia praised the majority for not deferring to Congress, stating that such deference is not 
appropriate when the two branches are in disagreement.  See id. at 704-05 (Scalia J., 
dissenting).  Morrison, however, did not present a dispute between the executive branch and 
Congress, but rather a dispute among executive branch officials, namely the special 
prosecutor and the executive branch officials she was investigating.  See id. at 665-668 
(showing that this case arose out of an effort by three government attorneys under 
investigation by independent counsel Morrison to squash a subpoena).  The President was 
not a party to this suit.  Moreover, the President had signed this legislation.  14 WEEKLY 
COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS No. 1854 (1978) (characterizing the Special 
Prosecutor as a “necessary response” to past embarrassments); Devins, supra note 13, at 
283-84 (noting President Reagan’s approval of a legislation ceding executive authority to 
the independent counsel).  Scalia’s remarks provide an inadequate rationale for not seriously 
considering whether the Court should defer, at least to some extent, to the political 
branches’ agreement that this reform would serve the rule of law. 
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and not the only means, the Constitution employs to secure a rule of law.223  
The duty-based theory would have provided a means of grappling with the 
core Constitutional issues the case posed.   
Of course, the Morrison Court did not write on a blank slate.  The 
Court’s opinion proved unsatisfactory, because it had to take into account 
prior dicta that reflects acceptance of some elements of the unitary 
executive theory, at least with respect to removal.  We now must consider 
the duty-based theory’s implications for patronage state, including the law 
on both appointment and removal.  
  
B. Whither the Patronage State? 
 1. Removal — The duty-based theory implies that the Constitution 
does not require Congress to authorize presidential removal of purely 
executive officials “at will.”  An authority to fire employees “for cause” 
adequately secures faithful law execution, for such a provision authorizes 
removals for malfeasance in office.   
The notion that the President must have an authority to fire at will 
comes from the political dimension of the unitary executive theory—that the 
President has a constitutional right to control the government for his own 
political ends.  We have seen that this political dimension is utterly foreign 
to the Framers’ conception of executive power.   
 The Supreme Court has regularly approved provisions prohibiting 
removal of officials except for cause.224 While lawyers often cite the 
Supreme Court’s case in Myers v. United States225 for the proposition that 
the Constitution requires at-will removal,226 that case has a much narrower 
holding.  The Myers Court invalidated a provision that only authorized the 
President to remove a postmaster if the Senate consented.227  It held that the 
President has the authority to remove officers without the Senate’s consent, 
                                                   
223
 Cf. BRUFF, supra note 30, at 437 (noting lawyers’ tendency to be overzealous); Morrison, 
487 U.S. at 727-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the theoretical potential for vigorous 
prosecution of fairly minor offenses without any examination of the actual experience under 
the statute). 
224
 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685-686 (1989) (upholding provision authorizing 
only for cause removal of an independent counsel); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 
356 (1958) (holding that the President may not fire a member of the War Claims 
Commission, even though no statute limited removal); Humphrey’s Executor v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935) (holding that Congress may limit the grounds for removing 
a member of a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agency). 
225
 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
226
 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 688-89 (discussing appellee’s contention that the President 
must be able to remove purely executive officers at will under Myers). 
227
 See Myers, 272 U.S. at 107, 162 (showing that the Court invalidated a provision requiring 
Senate approval of presidential removal decisions, because the President alone has removal 
power).   
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but did not have before it a provision presenting the question of whether the 
removal must be at will.228   
 A clear rule allowing for-cause removal of all officers resolves 
contradictions in the Court’s removal jurisprudence and supports a less ad 
hoc approach.  In Morrison, the Court indicated that restrictions upon 
removal must not “impede the President’s ability to perform his 
Constitutional duty.”229  In response, Justice Scalia complained, not without 
reason, that this test provides no clear rule for decision, as it depends upon 
the Court’s subjective assessment of how much removal restriction is 
tolerable.230  A proper understanding of the Constitution’s emphasis on duty 
and a rejection of the political dimension of the Unitary Executive theory 
solves this problem.  Restrictions on removal should always be 
constitutional if they do not impede the President’s duty as defined in the 
Constitution, which as we have seen, requires that he seek faithful law 
execution.  He may wish to exercise policy control over all discretionary 
government decisions, but he does not have to do so in order to seek faithful 
execution of the law.231   
This also solves another problem arising from the Court’s 
jurisprudence.  The Court has often suggested that the question of whether 
the Constitution requires at-will removal hinges on an assessment of 
whether the officer in question is performing executive, judicial, or quasi-
legislative functions.232  This functional approach makes the 
constitutionality of removal restrictions hinge upon unpredictable efforts by 
the Court to characterize particular official functions as executive, judicial, 
or quasi-legislative.233 A bright line rule accepting for cause removal solves 
this problem.  This functional approach emerges from an attempt to 
reconcile some of former President Taft’s statements in Myers that suggest 
that a postmaster must be removable at will with the Court’s holdings that 
for cause removal suffices.234  Morrison’s upholding of for cause removal of 
                                                   
228
 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687 n. 24 (describing “the only issue actually decided” in 
Myers as whether the President could remove a postmaster without the Senate’s consent); 
Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 626 (same).   
229
 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 685-86 [emphasis added]. 
230
 Id. at 711-12.  Accord ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES, 354 (3rd ed. 2006) (describing this test as neither “clear” nor “easy to apply.”); 
BRUFF, supra note 30, at 442 (describing the test as generally “quite difficult to apply”). 
231
 Cf. Myers, 272 U.S. at 134 (Taft, C.J.) (justifying at will removal by reference to the 
President’s “discretion” to determine the “national public interest”).    
232
 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687 (stating that Congress may limit the removal of officers, 
“at least” if they are performing quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions); Humphrey’s 
Executor, 295 U.S. at 627 (distinguishing Myers as an opinion pertaining to an officer 
“restricted to . . . executive functions”); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 353 (1958) 
(defining the issue before it in terms of the officer’s function).   
233
 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689 n. 28 (recognizing “the difficulty of defining such 
categories”); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879) (same); Strauss, Agencies, supra 
note 13, at 579 (stating that the separation-of-powers theory “breaks down” when applied to 
“agencies within one of the three branches”). 
234
 Compare Myers, 272 U.S. at 134 (claiming that the President must have the authority to 
fire those he loses confidence in) with Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691-92 (upholding provisions 
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a purely executive officer supersedes Myer’s dictum on this point, and the 
Court should clarify the law by repudiating former President and Chief 
Justice Taft’s extraneous statements more clearly than it has in prior 
cases.235 
The duty-based theory informs debate about more theoretical 
removal questions, even if it does not clearly resolve every question.  The 
theory’s originalism can clash with some views of duty-based functional 
considerations embedded in constitutional custom and precedent.   
From a functional standpoint, the President’s duty to faithfully 
execute the law may seem to require Congress to give him for-cause 
removal authority.  But the Framers’ omission of Presidential removal 
authority suggests that the President can “take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed” without unilateral removal authority, even though he 
cannot personally assure their faithful execution without such an authority.  
Still, for-cause removal authority can serve rule of law values at the heart of 
theory. 
If the duty-based theory allows unilateral presidential removal 
authority it may permit (even though it does not require) delegation of at-
will removal authority.  The Constitution does not, on this reading, prohibit 
presidential politics or congressional acquiescence in the growth of 
presidential power.  If the Congress finds that the President respects the rule 
of law and exercises his discretion wisely, the Congress may properly 
decide that the President should have a broad removal power.  But if it finds 
that the President uses the ability to fire employees at will to prevent 
employees of the executive branch from following the law, it should deny 
at-will removal authority.  For then the authority nullifies the Constitution’s 
constraint on presidential abuse embodied in the General Oath clause, since 
it can render a duty-bound official’s refusal to perform an illegal act 
nugatory.236  
A strict adherence to original intention, however, supports 
forbidding Presidential removal without Senate consent, at least in the case 
of “Officers of the United States.”  Originalist precepts insist that text and 
contemporaneous history carry more weight than post-enactment history.  
The text and pre-enactment history support a mandatory Senate role in 
removal.  In light of the lack of post-enactment consensus about Presidential 
removal authority, especially in the Senate, it is poor originalism to invoke 
                                                                                                                            
forbidding at will removal of the independent counsel); Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 
629 (upholding provisions forbidding at will removal of a member of the Federal Trade 
Commission). 
235
 Cf. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 687 (disapproving Myer’s dicta to some extent, but stating that 
for cause removal is constitutional “at least in regard to quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial 
agencies.”); Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 626 (disapproving unidentified statements 
supporting the government’s argument for at-will removal “in so far as they are out of 
harmony with the views here set forth”).   See also Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 627 
(acknowledging that dicta need not be followed unless persuasive).  
236
 See generally, Froomkin, Note, supra note 14, at 789 (noting that “autonomy requires 
insulation from politically motivated removal”). 
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that Decision of 1789 to support a Constitutional rule that the Congress 
must allow the President to remove officers of the United States without 
Senate approval.237   
Of course, Myers held that Congress may not insist on Senate 
consent to removal and constitutional custom supports allowing Congress to 
delegate some removal authority the President.  So the duty-based theory’s 
clarification of original intention raises issues of how much weight to give 
original intent in light of precedent and custom departing from that intent.       
 The duty-based theory reveals an original intent disfavoring 
unilateral Presidential removal, even though for-cause removal authority 
can aid faithful law execution.  Even if it is too late in the day to conform 
our practice to that intent, we should recognize that the Constitution does 
not affirmatively require Congress to give the President the power to 
remove officials.   
 2.  Appointment — The duty-based theory supports an appointments 
process aimed at securing apolitical government, such as the civil service 
laws.238  The theory’s unremarked influence helps explain why these laws 
came into being.  The political dimension of the unitary executive theory 
threatens this ideal of apolitical administration.  The civil service laws 
require non-partisan hiring.  If we accept, however, the notion that the 
President has the right to have officials under him loyal to his priorities, 
rather than to the law’s priorities, then the civil service laws appear 
constitutionally suspect.239  
Justice department attorneys, apparently viewing their job as the one 
suggested by the unitary executive theory, recently sought to hire employees 
“attuned to the interests and policies of the President,” in violation of the 
civil service laws forbidding partisan appointments.240   Indeed, one of these 
employees when called to account for this partisan hiring in a hearing before 
the Senate Judiciary Commission said that she took her “oath to the 
                                                   
237
 Cf.  Myers, 272 U.S. at 108-139 (providing a brief discussion of Constitutional text and 
pre-enactment history and a lengthy discussion of the post-enactment decision of 1789). 
238
 See Gerald E. Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service 
Employees, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942, 947-961 (1976) (discussing the history of civil service 
reform); Strauss, Agencies, supra note 13, at 582 (characterizing a “civil service, largely 
insulated from politics” as the “fourth branch” of government). 
239
 Compare Strauss, Agencies, supra note 13, at 608 (explaining that the civil service laws 
sharply limits presidential control of civil servants) with CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 16, 
at 230 (recognizing that “expansion of the civil service is often perceived as inconsistent 
with the unitariness (sic) of the executive branch,” but opining that this perception is not 
correct). 
240
 See JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING 
BY MONICA GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 135-
139 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-opa-658.html 
(concluding that Monica Goodling and others committed numerous violations of the civil 
service law requiring non-partisan hiring practices); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICES 
OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AN INVESTIGATION OF 
ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICAL HIRING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HONORS PROGRAM AND 
SUMMER LAW INTERN PROGRAM 99 (2008) (finding political hiring practices that violated 
Civil Service law and Justice Department policy).   
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President . . .  very seriously.”241  In a contemporary illustration of the Oath 
Clause’s continued relevance, Senator Leahy reminded her that she swore 
an oath to the Constitution, not the President, obviously in an effort to 
remind her of her duties to obey the law.242  While even the Bush 
Administration did not explicitly claim that the civil service laws were 
unconstitutional, the political dimension of the unitary executive theory 
does raise this issue.243   
The Myers Court confronted the conflict of the theory of the 
patronages state with the civil service laws and opted to preserve the civil 
service laws, declining to extend its dicta demanding at will removal 
authority to the inferior officers covered by civil service restrictions on 
personnel actions.244  Indeed, the Myers Court, consistent with the duty-
based theory’s rejection of the political dimension of the unitary theory, 
insisted that Congress could apply the merit system to a wider array of 
government officials by vesting the appointment power over officials then 
subject to presidential nomination and Senate approval requirements in 
heads of departments in order to “remove[] them from politics.”245    
The Morrison Court’s approach to the Appointments Clause, 
however, calls the flexibility Myers envisioned for congressional 
classification of officers into question.  For the Justices, both the majority 
and the dissent, sought to limit Congress’ ability to choose whether Senate 
confirmation is required through an unsuccessful attempt to create judicial 
guidance about the meaning of the terms “Officers of the United States” and 
“inferior Officers.”  The Constitution requires that the President nominate 
and the Senate confirm Officers of the United States, but allows Congress to 
vest the power to appoint Inferior Officers in the judiciary or other parts of 
the government.246  Hence, a holding that an independent counsel is an 
Officer of the United States would require invalidation of the statutory 
provision authorizing the judiciary to appoint her.247  The opaque language 
of these undefined terms left the Court rudderless.248  The independent 
counsel’s independence suggests that she is not an Inferior Officer, as 
                                                   
241
 Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the 
Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys? Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th  Cong. 411 
(2007) (testimony of Sara M. Taylor, Former Deputy Assistant to President Bush and 
Director of Political Affairs at the White House). 
242
 See id. at 416-17. 
243
 Cf. SAVAGE, supra note 10, at 239-40 (noting that President Bush used a signing 
statement to argue that the President need not obey laws establishing minimum professional 
qualifications for Federal Emergency Management Agency employees) 
244
 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 56, 173-74 (1926) (affirming that Congress may attack 
the spoils system through civil service reform). 
245
 Id.; accord Strauss, Agencies, supra note 13, at 614 (describing Myers as recognizing that 
Congress may place the Postmaster General beyond Presidential control by making him part 
of the civil service). 
246
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
247
 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1989). 
248
 See id. at 671 (acknowledging that the “line” between inferior and principle officers is 
unclear). 
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Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent.249  On the other hand, her limited 
jurisdiction suggests that she is nothing like the department heads that 
traditionally have been considered “Officers of the United States.”250  
Hence, the Constitution’s undefined language could not satisfactorily 
resolve the question, and neither the majority nor the dissent could make a 
persuasive argument for their positions on how to classify the office of 
independent counsel.251 
 A duty-based approach would have helped the Court address the 
issue at hand more effectively by encouraging it to grapple more 
forthrightly with the question of whether an independent counsel furthered 
the rule of law.252  While formal rules might resolve some cases, in cases 
such as this where they cannot help much, value choices, whether 
articulated are not, control the results.  When such a case arises under 
Article II, the principal relevant value choice animating this part of the 
Constitution, namely the Founders’ and ratifiers’ decision to seek an 
executive branch dedicated to faithfully executing the law, should inform 
judicial decision-making.   
 
C. Independent Agencies 
Congress has sought to make some agencies independent by limiting 
the President’s power to appoint or remove their leaders.253  These limits 
include requirements that commissioners have relevant expertise, serve for 
relatively long and staggered terms in office, and remain immune from at-
will removal.254    
These arrangements seem, at first glance to epitomize the ideal of 
relying on independent officials’ sense of duty as a key element of 
administration.  But I have defined the duty-based theory as one that 
contemplates presidential leadership aimed at securing faithful execution of 
the law.  Unitarians might object that independent agencies involve not just 
a rejection of presidential control, but a rejection of the sort of presidential 
influence the duty-based theory embraces.   
Happily for independent agencies’ supporters, “empirical studies 
show that presidents have significant influence over policy” even in 
“independent agencies.”255  
                                                   
249
 See id. at 716 (Scalia J., dissenting). 
250
 See id. at 672 (majority opinion). 
251
 See BRUFF, supra note 30, at 403 (characterizing the arguments on this point as 
“approximately in equipoise”). 
252
 See, e.g., Stephen Carter, The Independent Council Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105, 126 
(1988) 
253
 See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies:  Party Polarization 
and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B. U. L. REV. 459, 459 (2008). 
254
 See id. at 462 (characterizing “partisan requirements, and for-cause” limits on removal as 
intended to limit Presidential control). 
255
 Stack, supra note 115, at 298.  See, e.g., Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The 
Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801, 812-23 
(1991); Terry M. Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN 
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The duty-based theory only requires significant presidential influence over 
law execution aimed at avoiding faithless execution of law, not necessarily 
significant control over policymaking. 
 Independent agencies, however, may properly exercise quasi-
legislative authority without substantial presidential involvement.  As the 
Supreme Court explained in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,256 the 
Constitution does not authorize the President to make law.257  While 
Youngstown does not preclude Congress from delegating quasi-legislative 
authority to the President, it does show that the power to make law, unlike 
the power to execute law, does not inherently belong to the President.  It 
comes into the President’s office only because of congressional 
delegation.258  And Congress may, if it likes, place the delegated power 
elsewhere, such as in independent agencies.   
The unitary executive theory, even if it were correct, could not 
justify requiring that the President control execution of quasi-legislative or 
quasi-judicial authority, for that power is not what the Framers had in mind 
when it created a unitary executive.259  This much flows from the textual 
limits of the Vesting Clause itself, which only vests “executive” power.260  
The relevant Supreme Court precedent supports this.  In Humphrey’s 
Executor v. United States261 and Wiener v. United States262 the Supreme 
Court distinguished and to some extent repudiated Myers’ unitary dicta, in 
order to uphold the practice of insulating independent agencies exercising 
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers.263  Accordingly, even Justice 
                                                                                                                            
POLITICS 235, 269-71 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1985) (finding greater 
presidential than congressional control over the federal bureaucracy); Terry M. Moe, 
Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. SCI. 197, 207-18 
(1982) (finding a correlation between presidency changes and independent agency policy 
shifts); see also Strauss, Agencies,  supra note 13, at 590-96 (discussing sources of 
presidential influence over independent agencies).  
256
 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
257
 Id. at 587-88 (claiming that the President’s faithful execution power “refutes the idea that 
he is to be a lawmaker.”) 
258
 See  Charles L. Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, 1 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 13, 17 (1974) (describing how power has flowed to the President 
through delegations and acquiescence).   
259
 See I CORWIN, supra note 141, at 318-20 (explaining why it is desirable to create 
independence for officials carrying out quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative functions).  
260
 Accord Bruce Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the President to Execute the Laws, 46 
TENN. L. REV. 757, 773 (1979) (pointing out that quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power 
are “not now considered . . . part of the executive power” and are therefore beyond the 
“President’s reach”).  Contra Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 13, at 1183 n. 153 (arguing 
that powers exercised by bureaucrats must be executive, because Congress may only 
delegate executive power). 
261
 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
262
 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
263
 See Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 626-29 (finding that Congress could protect 
officers exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers from presidential removal and 
repudiating dicta in Myers to the extent inconsistent with its opinion); Wiener, 357 U.S. at 
352, 356 (recounting Humphrey’s repudiation of Myers’ dicta and holding that the President 
lacked authority to remove a quasi-judicial member of the War Claims Commission). 
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Scalia’s articulation of the unitary theory in Morrison confined itself to the 
exercise of purely executive powers.264  
 The Framers did not contemplate making the President the sole 
author of quasi-legislative rules or judicial decisions.265  And this is not only 
because they did not contemplate broad delegation at all.  It is also because 
they did not contemplate the modern political role of the President.  The 
Framers’ rejection of the political dimensions of the unitary executive 
theory implies that Congress may delegate quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial authority to executive branch entities not completely under the 
Presidential thumb. 
 While the duty-based theory accepts agency independence, the 
underlying analysis raises some questions about requiring collective 
executive branch decisionmaking.  After all, the theory accepts the idea that 
the Framers chose a single executive to avoid decision by committee, 
especially in the context of defense and foreign affairs.  Collective 
decisionmaking, unlike independent decisionmaking by a single individual, 
threatens that model.266   
 But the Framers only accepted a single “executive.”  This model 
need not extend to quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions, where the 
Constitution often employs models of collective decisionmaking, as 
exemplified by Congress and the Supreme Court.   
 Still, the validity of a piece of the unitary executive theory might 
raise legitimate questions about legislation empowering a committee to 
carry out battles or conduct foreign affairs.  The duty-based theory does not 
deny that the model of an energetic executive may require some limits on 
collective decisionmaking outside of Congress.  But it generally affirms the 
validity of independent agencies. 
 
 
                                                   
264
 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1987) (Scalia J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
President’s lack of “exclusive control” violates the Constitution in this case because 
prosecution is a “purely executive power”).   
265
 Of course, the Supreme Court has held that Congress may not delegate legislative 
authority to anybody, even the President.  See Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 
495, 537-38 (1935) (holding that the Congress may not delegate its legislative authority to 
the President); Panama Refining v. United States, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (holding that 
Congress may not delegate its “essential legislative functions” to others).  It permits, 
however, delegation of quasi-legislative authority because of the difficulty of defining the 
difference between executive and legislative authority.  See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989) (affirming delegation of power to a commission to establish 
ranges of sentences for numerous federal crimes); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 
531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (explaining that the Court “has almost never felt qualified to 
second-guess” Congressional judgments about the degree of discretion to leave agencies).  
Having permitted broad delegation in practice, insisting on presidential control of that 
delegation would further erode the principal of Congressional control of legislation that 
justifies the non-delegation doctrine.   Cf. Strauss, Agencies, supra note 13, at 637 (finding 
presidential rulemaking “problematic”).   
266
 But see Mashaw, supra note 160, at 1301-02 (describing the early Republic as employing 
the use of “Board of Eminent” officers to carry out various administrative functions).   
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CONCLUSION 
 The Constitution requires that the law, not the President, control the 
executive branch of government.  To that end, it relies heavily on instilling a 
duty to obey the law and chooses checks and balances over personal control 
by a single individual and his faction. 
